Gordon Carrera

to other elites and to maybe their security services.

They don't necessarily have their finger on the pulse of what's going on in the bazaars or out the mythical street, as they often call it, the Arab street or whatever, which I always think is a weird notion.

But there is something there about not having a feel for wider society because you're so invested in your relationships within the elite.

But isn't that always the case with intelligence failures is that someone will go, the intelligence was there in the system, the facts were there in the system, but the analytic framework wasn't there to understand those facts or because of the perception of politics or what policymakers want, it doesn't get to the top in the way it should.

People aren't willing to challenge the kind of preconceptions out there.

So in that way, it does feel like a kind of

classic intelligence failure to some extent.

To have people saying in the system there are weaknesses there, but not be able to kind of hear that into an argument, which challenges a very established view, which is the Shahzar ally, he's there, he's going to stay there, nothing's going to happen.

I remember it vividly.

It was quite long, actually, in my rock days.

Let's not get into that.

That's definitely a diversion.

As I can see here, you had the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917.

I'm not old enough to get to those ones as examples of where revolutions came, perhaps with surprise.

But I think 1989 is one I do remember.

when famously the Berlin Wall falls.

And I remember incredibly vividly, I actually kept all the newspapers from that time because you just felt the headlines were so important.

And I think it's also a really good case study for why some revolutions are not seen coming and why some get crushed and some succeed in overthrowing the regimes.

So if you look at Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union under communism in that period, you

And I think Western intelligence could see that communism was decaying.