Greg Salmieri

speaker
1,054 appearances 3 recordings 1 series first heard Aug 2013 last heard Jan 2021

Greg Salmieri’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

Trend

recordings per month · last 12 months
No recordings in the last 12 months.Older appearances are listed below; set an alert to hear about the next one.

Appearances

newest first · ▶ plays the moment
Again, I think it's weird to call that kind of a view egoistic.
I don't think it's right.
And even a view like Aristotle's, I don't I think it's ambiguous whether it's egoistic, uh, because I think there's some ambiguities in his theory.
So I think it has to be that in some sense
the goodness for you is explanatory of the moral status of the action for it to be egoistic.
So they coincide and they coincide because the actions that benefiting you or the facts that make it benefit you are the ones that make it count as moral.
Rather than there being an account of its morality,
That's wholly independent of its benefit to you, and then it's being moral.
posterior to that uh enables it to benefit.
But
it's being good for you follows from its being right rather than it's being right follows from its being good for you.
In effect the goodness for you has to be prior to the rightness.
For it to be an egoism.
Now there's a a little bit of a complications to that uh uh because if we're talking about a particular concrete action, at least on my own view, the moral goodness of the action is part of what makes it good for you, but the the
the principles themselves the which we judge individual actions are themselves justified at a kind of uh broader level by their contribution to one's own life.
So most often these days uh this issue is put in terms of well being or sometimes flourishing rather than self-interest.
I take it one's self-interest is one's own well being.
And I think there's uh r significant elements of truth in a lot of what's been written about it nowadays.
Um
My own view was
Showing 341–360 of 1,054 · page 18 of 53 ← Previous Next →