Herman Cappelen
speaker
421 appearances
1 recordings
1 series
first heard Jan 2013
last heard Jan 2013
Herman Cappelen’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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Well, I think all the work I've done in philosophy has been in part methodologically self-conscious.
In fact, I think it's very hard to do any philosophy without thinking all the time about how we go about doing it.
I think it's one of the characteristics of philosophy that we're
constantly thinking about how to do what we're doing while we're doing it.
So from the very beginning when I started doing philosophy, these very general questions about how you could go about doing this, those questions were always central to me.
In my first type of work, the first book was called Insensitive Semantics, and one of the topics of that book was
what kind of evidence, what kind of data could be used to support certain kinds of thesis about context sensitivity in natural language.
And my thought about that book was it was more or less entirely methodological.
There was questions about how to go about adjudicating certain kinds of debates and what kind of data we should be focusing on and how to interpret that data.
So thinking about methodology has been central
central to how I've done philosophy always.
And I think to most good philosophy, most good philosophy is methodologically self-conscious.
About five years ago, I guess now, or four years ago, here at the Arche Center in San Andreas, I started a project with my colleague Jessica Brown on philosophical methodology.
It was a four-year project with weekly meetings.
Many, many workshops and conferences all focused around questions about meta-philosophy.
And one of the core questions in that project had to do with the role of intuitions.
Most of the discussions we had about that topic were questions about whether intuitions were the kinds of things that could be relied on as evidence in philosophy.
But my...
underlying suspicion from the beginning there was that, well, maybe we should question more fundamentally whether it even is the case that philosophers rely on intuitions.
I noticed that this was common ground in a lot of these debates that people were having, even among people who seem radically opposed to each other, like
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