Ian Bremmer

talked about a few weeks ago when we last had a public conversation.

The Saudis, on the other hand, their principal alliance outside of the US is with Pakistan, a nuclear power.

And they are increasingly aligned with Egypt, with Turkey, but also are thinking long term about how to make a deal with a post-war Iran to ensure their own security.

They don't need to use the Strait.

They don't have to worry as much about Iran disrupting it or tolling it because they can get 7 million barrels a day through the Red Sea from their export terminal in Yanbu, the east-west pipeline that they have.

They're focused much more on a 35 million strong population that they want to make sure has the ability and the money to develop, not an expat heavy 90% population that the UAE has.

And so this war, again, there've been fights between MBS and MBZ that predate this war.

We saw that play out in Yemen.

We saw that play out in Sudan.

We've seen that play out in financial decision-making.

But it has been accelerated and intensified by the war and the very divergent responses to the war geopolitically, militarily, and economically by these two very successful countries with very different models.

And I think that's what has led to the UAE to make this announcement, an announcement that's made when the Strait is closed.

So it doesn't have any proximate economic impact tomorrow, but it will.

It would not surprise me if the Emiratis leave the Organization of Islamic Countries, the OIC.

I have heard from both the Emiratis and the Saudis and others in the Gulf that they think the Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCC, which is the overarching regional framework, however loose, is not fit for purpose anymore.

So that could also fall apart.

It's becoming a GZERO Middle East, right?

in that regard.

And it's a lot closer.

It's a lot easier to hit if you're Iran, right?