Jamie Edwards

speaker
102 appearances 7 recordings 1 series first heard Jun 2011 last heard Apr 2012

Jamie Edwards’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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You became a Berkeley professor in nineteen fifty nine, and you have worked steadily since then in a range of areas in philosophy.
Could you say something about how the philosophical landscape has and hasn't changed since your time as a student in Oxford?
Do you think that the emphasis on formal philosophy has led to philosophical mistakes or do you think that it's just leaving too much that's essential out of the picture?
So outside the discipline of philosophy, one tremendous advance has been in neuroscience and our understanding of the brain.
And this is something that interests you.
Could you say how the advances in this has helped philosophy to think about certain considerations and and how philosophy can in turn help this research
So perhaps to segue just a bit, you could say something about your recent work in social ontology.
You you've traditionally had very strong realist commitments.
Yeah.
Uh but society is a peculiar sort of reality.
It's not quite like mountains, it's not quite like rocks or tables or chairs.
Perhaps you could say something about this.
So it seems that the dispute between the contextualist and the minimalist, what will decide the dispute will be whether the contextualist can convince us that all of the meaning of our utterances are shot through with these contextual considerations. matched
or for the minimalists to show us that it's not so difficult to set up these boundaries, to allow minimal conditions in which context is important, but to establish that those are in fact minimal. matched
Could you say something about why the contextualist thinks that meaning is shot through with these contextual considerations? matched
And the way that we might resist that and show that we can really set up a boundary to prevent these contextual considerations from overrunning our theories of meaning. matched
So you mentioned that the contextualist wants the theory of meaning to track our intuitive sense of what is said. matched
And that seems, on the face of it, a nice result to have from a theory of meaning. matched
Is the reason that we want to resist this because the attempt to do it inevitably fails for some of the reasons we've already canvassed? matched
Or is there some other independent reason we don't require this of our theory of meaning? matched
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