Jason Bordoff

Yeah.

We wrote that piece because I think that the idea of energy being weaponized, which of course was a national trauma in the 1970s, particularly after the Arab oil embargo, lines at the gas station, really, it did have a long-lasting effect on energy policy in the United States.

And the way we think about energy has been framed by that idea.

trauma that energy, particularly in the Middle East, could be weaponized.

But the world has changed a lot in the half century since then.

The United States is now the largest producer of oil in the world by far.

And generally, we've had this multi-decade period of relatively cooperative and copacetic geopolitics, economic cooperation, globalization, bringing other countries into the fold through the World Trade Organization and in other ways.

And so I think we generally became a bit complacent with risks to energy security, viewed them as largely a thing of the past.

We had this unprecedented increase in U.S.

supply that comforted markets a little bit and provided ample supply, kept prices low.

Power demand was flat in the United States and Europe for the last 20 years.

Of course, now it's surging again with data centers and other things.

But the most significant shift is the global order we knew seems to be collapsing beneath our feet.

And we're in a new world of conflict and competition and rivalry between great powers.

And in a world that is in disorder like that, a world where there is increased risk of conflict and competition, there's no reason energy.

would not be a key weapon and a key source of vulnerability.

And we're starting to see that play out.

Obviously, what Russia did to cut off the gas supply to Europe after it invaded Ukraine, or even China last year restricted rare earth exports.

And that really shook up the foreign policy community in ways that sent shockwaves through it.

Yeah, it's hard to disagree with what you just said.