Jefferson Morley

But if you look at Kennedy's record in 1963, his policies were a very bold challenge to the conventional wisdom of the national security agencies in the United States in several ways. He pushed a test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, a measure that his generals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously and vehemently privately opposed. Kennedy used his prestige as a peacemaker,

which he gained during the Cuban Missile Crisis to prevail upon the generals and to get the Senate to approve that. And when they did approve it in September, 1963, Kennedy said that was his proudest moment as president. So Kennedy was moving the country, the ship of state in a new direction, not radically, slowly, but definitely. And the enemies of his policies

which he gained during the Cuban Missile Crisis to prevail upon the generals and to get the Senate to approve that. And when they did approve it in September, 1963, Kennedy said that was his proudest moment as president. So Kennedy was moving the country, the ship of state in a new direction, not radically, slowly, but definitely. And the enemies of his policies

which he gained during the Cuban Missile Crisis to prevail upon the generals and to get the Senate to approve that. And when they did approve it in September, 1963, Kennedy said that was his proudest moment as president. So Kennedy was moving the country, the ship of state in a new direction, not radically, slowly, but definitely. And the enemies of his policies

in Cuba, in Vietnam, for example, were very, very unhappy with him in 1963. That's the political setting in which Kennedy is assassinated, in which there are real schisms in his administration about the wisdom of his policy. And there is a pervasive feeling among the enemies of his policies that Kennedy is not only weak, but he's actually a danger to U.S. national security.

in Cuba, in Vietnam, for example, were very, very unhappy with him in 1963. That's the political setting in which Kennedy is assassinated, in which there are real schisms in his administration about the wisdom of his policy. And there is a pervasive feeling among the enemies of his policies that Kennedy is not only weak, but he's actually a danger to U.S. national security.

in Cuba, in Vietnam, for example, were very, very unhappy with him in 1963. That's the political setting in which Kennedy is assassinated, in which there are real schisms in his administration about the wisdom of his policy. And there is a pervasive feeling among the enemies of his policies that Kennedy is not only weak, but he's actually a danger to U.S. national security.

That was a very common feeling in the upper echelons of the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1963.

That was a very common feeling in the upper echelons of the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1963.

That was a very common feeling in the upper echelons of the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1963.

Well, so if we compare our situation today with that time, you know, We live in a multipolar world now, right? Russia is a superpower. China is a superpower. So in 1962, there were really only two superpowers, Soviet Union and the United States. And they were locked in the stance called the Cold War, which doesn't really evoke the full danger of the situation.

Well, so if we compare our situation today with that time, you know, We live in a multipolar world now, right? Russia is a superpower. China is a superpower. So in 1962, there were really only two superpowers, Soviet Union and the United States. And they were locked in the stance called the Cold War, which doesn't really evoke the full danger of the situation.

Well, so if we compare our situation today with that time, you know, We live in a multipolar world now, right? Russia is a superpower. China is a superpower. So in 1962, there were really only two superpowers, Soviet Union and the United States. And they were locked in the stance called the Cold War, which doesn't really evoke the full danger of the situation.

What you had was two nuclear armed superpowers who really did not talk to each other or negotiate with each other. were armed to the teeth with, you know, extensive, massive nuclear arsenals, which were on a hair-trigger setting. A missile could get from the Soviet Union to the United States in 15 minutes. So if there was a nuclear attack launched, the U.S.

What you had was two nuclear armed superpowers who really did not talk to each other or negotiate with each other. were armed to the teeth with, you know, extensive, massive nuclear arsenals, which were on a hair-trigger setting. A missile could get from the Soviet Union to the United States in 15 minutes. So if there was a nuclear attack launched, the U.S.

What you had was two nuclear armed superpowers who really did not talk to each other or negotiate with each other. were armed to the teeth with, you know, extensive, massive nuclear arsenals, which were on a hair-trigger setting. A missile could get from the Soviet Union to the United States in 15 minutes. So if there was a nuclear attack launched, the U.S.

government would have to decide in 15 minutes whether to respond. And likewise for the Soviet Union. So the world lived in a state of anxiety suppressed anxiety that we really don't feel today.

government would have to decide in 15 minutes whether to respond. And likewise for the Soviet Union. So the world lived in a state of anxiety suppressed anxiety that we really don't feel today.

government would have to decide in 15 minutes whether to respond. And likewise for the Soviet Union. So the world lived in a state of anxiety suppressed anxiety that we really don't feel today.

And those feelings came to the fore in what's called the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, in which the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles south of Florida. And President Kennedy demanded that those missiles be removed. The Soviet Union refused. They said, you have missiles on our border, 20 miles from our border.