Jeffrey Sachs

I'm an economist, so I don't see the security decisions the same way, but every decision that I've seen always leans in the same direction for the last 30 years, which is power as the central objective. So Clinton faced an internal cabinet, really, debate should NATO be enlarged. This is a post-Cold War phenomenon? Well, I'll let John take that.

Let me step in for one moment. Okay, sure. Very quickly.

Let me step in for one moment. Okay, sure. Very quickly.

What an irony. Let me disagree just a bit because we agree actually on the behavior and I've learned I'd say most of that from you, that it's power-seeking. Truly, John, in my work 40 years overseas, I don't think the U.S. government gives a damn about these other places. I don't think they really care if it's a liberal democracy, if it's a dictatorship. They want the right of ways.

What an irony. Let me disagree just a bit because we agree actually on the behavior and I've learned I'd say most of that from you, that it's power-seeking. Truly, John, in my work 40 years overseas, I don't think the U.S. government gives a damn about these other places. I don't think they really care if it's a liberal democracy, if it's a dictatorship. They want the right of ways.

They want the military bases. They want the state to be in support of the United States. They want NATO enlargement. I know you've written, and there are some who believe in state building. God, if they do, they are so incompetent, it's unbelievable. But... Professor Sachs... I'll give you an example, if I could. Just one example. I'm a friend with one of the only Ph.D.

They want the military bases. They want the state to be in support of the United States. They want NATO enlargement. I know you've written, and there are some who believe in state building. God, if they do, they are so incompetent, it's unbelievable. But... Professor Sachs... I'll give you an example, if I could. Just one example. I'm a friend with one of the only Ph.D.

Afghani economists, senior person in the U.S.,

Afghani economists, senior person in the U.S.,

academia over the last thirty years you would think that this state department if they were interested in state building would ask him one day one moment something about afghanistan never happened never happened not even one question never happened he asked me can you get me a a meeting with the state department they were completely uninterested this is this is about power

academia over the last thirty years you would think that this state department if they were interested in state building would ask him one day one moment something about afghanistan never happened never happened not even one question never happened he asked me can you get me a a meeting with the state department they were completely uninterested this is this is about power

You're too idealistic, John. They don't care about the other places. They may feel we should be whatever we want, free and so forth. But freedom, I've seen with my own eyes the coups, the overthrows, the presidents, Democratic presidents led away. They don't care at all. This is Washington. Be a realist. Come on.

You're too idealistic, John. They don't care about the other places. They may feel we should be whatever we want, free and so forth. But freedom, I've seen with my own eyes the coups, the overthrows, the presidents, Democratic presidents led away. They don't care at all. This is Washington. Be a realist. Come on.

Could I come in here? Could I clarify a few things? Yeah, yeah. Look, first of all, almost all the time that we intervene, it's because we view this as a power situation for the US. So whether it's Ukraine or Syria or Libya or other places, even if we define it as defending something, believe me, it's not about defending something. It's about a perception of US power and U.S.

Could I come in here? Could I clarify a few things? Yeah, yeah. Look, first of all, almost all the time that we intervene, it's because we view this as a power situation for the US. So whether it's Ukraine or Syria or Libya or other places, even if we define it as defending something, believe me, it's not about defending something. It's about a perception of US power and U.S.

interest, and it's in objectives of U.S. global hegemony. And if we analyze the Ukraine conflict just even a little bit below the surface, this is not a conflict about Putin invading Ukraine. This is something a lot different that has to do with American power projection into the former Soviet Union. So it's completely different.

interest, and it's in objectives of U.S. global hegemony. And if we analyze the Ukraine conflict just even a little bit below the surface, this is not a conflict about Putin invading Ukraine. This is something a lot different that has to do with American power projection into the former Soviet Union. So it's completely different.

If we decide we're the police, which we do, you can't imagine how cynical bullshit we use to justify our actions. We used the cynical bullshit that we're defending the people of Benghazi to bomb the hell out of Libya to kill Muammar Gaddafi. Why did we do that? Well, I'm kind of an expert on that region, and I can tell you maybe because Sarkozy didn't like Gaddafi.

If we decide we're the police, which we do, you can't imagine how cynical bullshit we use to justify our actions. We used the cynical bullshit that we're defending the people of Benghazi to bomb the hell out of Libya to kill Muammar Gaddafi. Why did we do that? Well, I'm kind of an expert on that region, and I can tell you maybe because Sarkozy didn't like Gaddafi.

There's no much deeper reason except Hillary liked every bombing she could get her hands on. And Obama was kind of convinced. My Secretary of State says, go with it. So why don't we go with the NATO expedition? It had nothing to do with Libya. It unleashed 15 years of chaos, cheated the UN Security Council, because like everything else we've done, it was on false pretenses.