Michael Cembalest

I think after 100—I mean, it's only 100 days we're talking about. Anything is possible, right? The United States has a services surplus. And again, this is something Jamie's talked about publicly. One of the risks of all the tariff stuff is that other countries— retaliate against US services surplus because there's not that much non-agricultural goods exports that they can retaliate against.

So, um, yeah, I mean, people that provide insurance, money management, you know, um, but, you know, look, to the administration's point, the deck is already kind of stacked against US banks operating in other markets. That is a real issue. Um, there are real tariff and non-tariff barriers that exist in other countries. Um,

So, um, yeah, I mean, people that provide insurance, money management, you know, um, but, you know, look, to the administration's point, the deck is already kind of stacked against US banks operating in other markets. That is a real issue. Um, there are real tariff and non-tariff barriers that exist in other countries. Um,

So, um, yeah, I mean, people that provide insurance, money management, you know, um, but, you know, look, to the administration's point, the deck is already kind of stacked against US banks operating in other markets. That is a real issue. Um, there are real tariff and non-tariff barriers that exist in other countries. Um,

So the preconditions that the administration is reacting to were definitely up for debate and discussion. The question is, you know, is a grenade the right way to address them?

So the preconditions that the administration is reacting to were definitely up for debate and discussion. The question is, you know, is a grenade the right way to address them?

So the preconditions that the administration is reacting to were definitely up for debate and discussion. The question is, you know, is a grenade the right way to address them?

There are a few, and I'm not a technician, but there's a few technical things, breakpoints that you have to keep in mind. One of which is, and I mentioned this before about the trade-off between valuations and fundamentals. At one point, the equity market was down 20% in the United States. It was a brief moment earlier this year, but it was down 20%.

There are a few, and I'm not a technician, but there's a few technical things, breakpoints that you have to keep in mind. One of which is, and I mentioned this before about the trade-off between valuations and fundamentals. At one point, the equity market was down 20% in the United States. It was a brief moment earlier this year, but it was down 20%.

There are a few, and I'm not a technician, but there's a few technical things, breakpoints that you have to keep in mind. One of which is, and I mentioned this before about the trade-off between valuations and fundamentals. At one point, the equity market was down 20% in the United States. It was a brief moment earlier this year, but it was down 20%.

When the markets are down 20%, there's a dynamic that takes place, which is all of a sudden there's this metaphorical crypt that opens up and the financial media all of a sudden, you know, Nouriel Roubini and Albert Edwards and Soros and all kinds of negative market voices tend to reappear like ghosts whenever the market's down to tell you how it's going to get so much worse.

When the markets are down 20%, there's a dynamic that takes place, which is all of a sudden there's this metaphorical crypt that opens up and the financial media all of a sudden, you know, Nouriel Roubini and Albert Edwards and Soros and all kinds of negative market voices tend to reappear like ghosts whenever the market's down to tell you how it's going to get so much worse.

When the markets are down 20%, there's a dynamic that takes place, which is all of a sudden there's this metaphorical crypt that opens up and the financial media all of a sudden, you know, Nouriel Roubini and Albert Edwards and Soros and all kinds of negative market voices tend to reappear like ghosts whenever the market's down to tell you how it's going to get so much worse.

And I've published this thing over the years called the Armageddonists where every time there's a correction, then they come out and tell you how much worse it's going to get. And I plot how much money you make if you take the other side of the hat. Yeah.

And I've published this thing over the years called the Armageddonists where every time there's a correction, then they come out and tell you how much worse it's going to get. And I plot how much money you make if you take the other side of the hat. Yeah.

And I've published this thing over the years called the Armageddonists where every time there's a correction, then they come out and tell you how much worse it's going to get. And I plot how much money you make if you take the other side of the hat. Yeah.

Since World War II, when the equity markets have been down 20%, if you invest at that point, 85% of the time a year from then, you've made some money, usually double-digit returns. I can't explain why because, you know, the reasons why we're different every time.

Since World War II, when the equity markets have been down 20%, if you invest at that point, 85% of the time a year from then, you've made some money, usually double-digit returns. I can't explain why because, you know, the reasons why we're different every time.

Since World War II, when the equity markets have been down 20%, if you invest at that point, 85% of the time a year from then, you've made some money, usually double-digit returns. I can't explain why because, you know, the reasons why we're different every time.

But a rapid 20% correction over a short period of time tends to flush out a lot of the weak hands and reset the market for better fundamentals. And, you know, I still don't know if that's going to happen this time. I think the market rally has been too fast here and is underappreciating the hard data decline that's going to be taking place when it rolls through in May and June. But...