Oren Cass

It feels very akin to my view, like as you speak, it feels like a salve to my soul. I hear what you're saying, you say, you know, financial markets at profit is a wonderful driver of these things, but to utilize the energy of that profit motive, governments must also

löytävät tavoitteita luoda enemmän kestävää arvoa ihmisille työskentelemällä ja muilla asioilla. Tämä on minun ymmärrykseni siitä, mitä ajattelet olevan lehtis-ekonomista. Eikö Milton Friedman

the patron saint of this sort of, no, that's not what economics and capitalism is about. It's about pure profit. And that pure profit and the pursuit of it is actually what will create the most value. Is this a rebuttal?

Siihen Friedmanille. Jos olisitte sanoneet, että 70-luvulla, kun hän tuli ulos, se liittyi meitä seuraukseen taloudellisista markkinoista. Se liittyi meitä globalisaatioon ja kaikkiin poliittisiin poliitikkoihin, jotka voivat liittyä erittäin suurempiin... Silloin kapitali voittaa, ja työt pysyvät.

Kyllä, se on todennäköisesti heidän järjestelmäänsä. Mielestäni tärkein asia poliittisessa kontekstissa on se, että ennen kuin he kävivät yhdessä, tämä ei ollut kokoomus, kuten me ajattelemme nyt. Okei. Friedman ja toinen, joka liittyy meille paljon, Friedrich Hayek. Kyllä. Ja sinulla tulee hienoja kirjoja Hayekista. He ovat aktiivisia online. Kyllä.

What you find is that Friedman and Hayek were not conservatives. And they would not have described themselves as conservatives. In fact, Hayek, maybe his most famous essay is called Why I Am Not a Conservative. Literally, that's the title of the essay. And it goes to exactly what you were just describing, which is that Hayek basically says the wonder of the self-regulating market is

is what produces prosperity. And you just basically have to have faith that it will work and get out of the way. And all these conservatives out there don't have enough faith in that. And that's a real problem. And so up until that period, as you said, kind of the 70s and the 80s,

Toivottavasti konservatiiviset ja progressiiviset haastateltiin erilaisia asioita, mutta se ei ollut konservatiivinen näkökulma, että jos me vain menemme ulos, markkinoilla voidaan maksaa kaikkea. Se ei itse asiassa kuulosta hyvin konservatiivisena, jos pidetään ja ajattelemme siitä heti. Se, mikä tapahtui meidän poliitikassa, oli Ronald Reagan.

Reagan built this coalition. Reagan combined what you would call the free market libertarians, the Hayeks and Freedmans, the literally guys walking around with Adam Smith neckties. Do they still sell those? I don't know if they do. I wanted to reference it. I tried to do a little research. I think we've moved on maybe from that. But the –

Yhdistelmällä sitä yhdistelmällä maailmanlaajuisella konservatiivisuudella ja sitten myös kulttuurihankkeilla. Silloin oli paljon ihmisiä, jotka sanoivat, että mennään aloittamaan paljon sotaa.

Ja se on myös se, että he näyttivät sen mielestäni asemallaan kommunismin välillä, jota he näyttivät kuin jonkinlainen pysyvällinen valtio, joka järjestäisi perheitä. Se on oikeastaan oikea. Niin nämä ryhmät olivat yhdessä. He kaikki uskoivat, että suurin prioriteetti oli vahvistaa kommunismia, kuitenkaan se oli markkina-ekonomiset termit, kuitenkaan se oli sosiaali- ja religialliset termit. Laittaa meidät, joita uskallamme, koin ja sitten jatketaan. Kyllä. Ja suuri strategia kaikista näkökulmista.

I give them a lot of credit. It worked, right? They did win the Cold War. And that was very important. But that coalition then sort of lived on

Even after its animating purpose was gone. It's really in a lot of ways after the Cold War is won that things get out of control. That you start just saying, we're just going to keep cutting taxes no matter what. Reagan raised taxes five times when his initial reform didn't generate the revenue he wanted. Reagan was a protectionist. Reagan slapped all sorts of tariffs and stuff on the Japanese. After the Cold War is won,

This coalition sort of just keeps going. So you get the economic view that, no, no, no, it really is just the market is the end unto itself. I use the term market fundamentalism, which people think like, yeah, sure, it's a little derogatory. It doesn't sound great. But it's also a descriptive term. I mean, what is a fundamentalism? It is a sort of overly simplistic attempt to impose a very rigid set of beliefs, often in a way that completely misinterprets the original texts.

Are you sure you're not a lefty? You're preaching, baby. I keep trying to keep myself from going, amen, Oren. Come on, man. You're going to get me in trouble with this, John. Maybe we'll do a quick five-minute interview where I give you some of my more conservative views. That's what we're going to need later.

Fundamentalism is a sense of not only just reinterpreting texts, very rigid view, but that is specifically designed to give all of the authority to this narrow set of people who claim a special wisdom over what must be done. This is what certainly right of center economics, and to some extent I would say broadly, economics became. It was this sort of almost priesthood approach.

If you didn't understand that financial deregulation and free trade were going to be great for the typical worker, that was just because you were not sophisticated enough. Or did they even care? Oh, I think they did, for the most part. My experience, having been in the political world for a while, is like, yeah, there are outright bad actors. But by and large, if you're an economist, if you're even someone running for office in most cases, if you want to work in government,

You may have convinced yourself of this in some way, in various ways, but at the end of the day you are trying to do good things. And so a lot of folks really deeply believed, and let's remember on the, I mean, globalization, financialization, this was as much Clinton as it was Bush. It was an entirely sort of bipartisan consensus. And so these folks really, they really did believe it.

Let me ask you when, because my understanding of sort of the shift of this was we shifted from kind of, if I'm thinking about it in kind of epochs, you know, you have the New Deal epoch where it's kind of the government decides we also have to create a kind of framework of a safety net around to help maybe in some ways ameliorate the collateral damage that

the system may create for people at the lower levels. And then that begins to shift in the 70s with Friedman and those guys into this, you know, the famous Laffer curve, 1980s supply side trickle down economics.