Peter Kuznick

But that gets back to 1990, NATO expansion. And then in 1997, Brzezinski lays it out in his book, The Grand Chessboard, which... Feith and Libby and Hadley were also writing about just at the same time. And what Brzezinski says in the Grand Chessboard is that if you can separate Ukraine from Russia, then Russia will never be a Eurasian superpower again.

But that gets back to 1990, NATO expansion. And then in 1997, Brzezinski lays it out in his book, The Grand Chessboard, which... Feith and Libby and Hadley were also writing about just at the same time. And what Brzezinski says in the Grand Chessboard is that if you can separate Ukraine from Russia, then Russia will never be a Eurasian superpower again.

But that gets back to 1990, NATO expansion. And then in 1997, Brzezinski lays it out in his book, The Grand Chessboard, which... Feith and Libby and Hadley were also writing about just at the same time. And what Brzezinski says in the Grand Chessboard is that if you can separate Ukraine from Russia, then Russia will never be a Eurasian superpower again.

They had a strategy for doing exactly what they did for quite some time before that. This is not something that they've just thought up in 2014.

They had a strategy for doing exactly what they did for quite some time before that. This is not something that they've just thought up in 2014.

They had a strategy for doing exactly what they did for quite some time before that. This is not something that they've just thought up in 2014.

We had 185 ICBMs, and the Russians had four. Yeah, but I'm talking about in 1960 when Kennedy comes into office. Then we increase it by 1,000. And the Joint Chiefs, the Air Force wanted 10,000. Joint Chiefs wanted 3,000, I think it was. And McNamara said the lowest number we can get away with is 1,000.

We had 185 ICBMs, and the Russians had four. Yeah, but I'm talking about in 1960 when Kennedy comes into office. Then we increase it by 1,000. And the Joint Chiefs, the Air Force wanted 10,000. Joint Chiefs wanted 3,000, I think it was. And McNamara said the lowest number we can get away with is 1,000.

We had 185 ICBMs, and the Russians had four. Yeah, but I'm talking about in 1960 when Kennedy comes into office. Then we increase it by 1,000. And the Joint Chiefs, the Air Force wanted 10,000. Joint Chiefs wanted 3,000, I think it was. And McNamara said the lowest number we can get away with is 1,000.

But from the Soviet perspective, the United States was already ahead between 10 to 1 and 100 to 1 in every category. And now they see us adding 1,000 more ICBMs. So the Kremlin interpreted it that the U.S. was preparing for a first strike against the Soviet Union, which is part of the reason why they put the missiles into Cuba, to try to offset that, at least to some degree.

But from the Soviet perspective, the United States was already ahead between 10 to 1 and 100 to 1 in every category. And now they see us adding 1,000 more ICBMs. So the Kremlin interpreted it that the U.S. was preparing for a first strike against the Soviet Union, which is part of the reason why they put the missiles into Cuba, to try to offset that, at least to some degree.

But from the Soviet perspective, the United States was already ahead between 10 to 1 and 100 to 1 in every category. And now they see us adding 1,000 more ICBMs. So the Kremlin interpreted it that the U.S. was preparing for a first strike against the Soviet Union, which is part of the reason why they put the missiles into Cuba, to try to offset that, at least to some degree.

But again, you know, and Kennedy got a briefing on July 20th, 1961, about a secret advanced preemptive strike, nuclear strike to wipe out the Soviet Union.

But again, you know, and Kennedy got a briefing on July 20th, 1961, about a secret advanced preemptive strike, nuclear strike to wipe out the Soviet Union.

But again, you know, and Kennedy got a briefing on July 20th, 1961, about a secret advanced preemptive strike, nuclear strike to wipe out the Soviet Union.

And Kennedy walked out of that midway through the briefing. And he's turned to Dean Ruskin and said, and we call ourselves the human race.

And Kennedy walked out of that midway through the briefing. And he's turned to Dean Ruskin and said, and we call ourselves the human race.

And Kennedy walked out of that midway through the briefing. And he's turned to Dean Ruskin and said, and we call ourselves the human race.

Lemnitzer gave it, and one of the people there said, I think it was Roswell Gilpatrick, says he gave it as if he was talking to kindergartners, and Kennedy was so disgusted with it and his thinking behind the idea that we were going to have a preemptive surprise nuclear strike, unprovoked, against the Soviet Union. But there are military people who were thinking that way, as there are today.

Lemnitzer gave it, and one of the people there said, I think it was Roswell Gilpatrick, says he gave it as if he was talking to kindergartners, and Kennedy was so disgusted with it and his thinking behind the idea that we were going to have a preemptive surprise nuclear strike, unprovoked, against the Soviet Union. But there are military people who were thinking that way, as there are today.