Steve Yates
speaker
1,090 appearances
8 recordings
3 series
first heard Feb 2026
last heard 12 Sep
Steve Yates’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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recordings per month · last 12 monthsRecordings per month over the last 12 months — 8 in all, peaking in Sep 2026 with 1.
Appearances
had stopped them and turned them around and the what what exactly was the freight on the ships.
But this is mostly been
I don't think there's been anything since the advent of this conflict that would have tipped the balance in this coming from China.
But I think what China's contribution was was prior to February, weaponry, the sanctioned oil purchases being a flood of capital going into the market, and a lot of tech that was used to surveil their people.
probably help the tentacles of their terrorist network go out and do what they do.
Um and uh so that I think is what China's material assistance has been uh during the conflict a little harder to pin down, at least from what I can see.
Yeah, others will know the technical details of this better than I do, but the sense I've gotten from conversations with people like that is that a lot of this is Chinese tech Russian weaponization that has been tested in the conflict with Ukraine and then provided to allies in their BRICS network uh like Iran.
Uh there's uh a f uh foundation for defense of democracy, uh
Book that has been put out recently talking about this axis of China, Russia, i Iran, and North Korea being more of a network than a lot of our strategists would have acknowledged, and that we need to have a more systemic response to it.
But I think drones fall very much into that overlaying Venn diagram of Chinese manufactured components, Russian youth.
use and proof of concept and conflict and then provided in the broader network wherever they could.
Well, the the leading uh I think intellect and operator on a lot of this is uh Brendan Carr of the Federal Communications Commission, who's coming up with sort of the new guidelines or rules about uh our communications systems and if you and critical infrastructure.
Uh if you think of the the sort of searing experience that he had in uh assessing what happened in our cellular technology areas and uh in fire.
5G, there was a a lot that was taken over by Chinese components and even transmitters in the United States.
We ended up having to have costly and extreme measures put in place to have clean networks and clean supply chains for our national security manufacturing uh uh complex.
But there's also rip and replace policies being put in pla put in different states across the United States where they had Huawei technology.
That's running the comms that will tie into lots of different parts of Homeland Security.
And so if you take that experience and you look at where we're going on AI data centers and other kinds of things, can you allow for components to come into these new critical infrastructure pieces that are coming from the most likely advertisers?
adversary to use a backdoor or cyber action to cripple you in a time of crisis.
And to use that leverage the way they use leverage like rare earths.
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