Tal Zaks

And one of the lessons I took from that failure is that this was probably not well enough funded and not given enough opportunity, either with the team structure or the financial structure or the scientific structure, to have that degrees of freedom to adjust.

And one of the lessons I took from that failure is that this was probably not well enough funded and not given enough opportunity, either with the team structure or the financial structure or the scientific structure, to have that degrees of freedom to adjust.

And if you look at investments that have been successful, I think you're giving them some degrees of freedom and you've got a management team that has the right functions able to do that. For me, it's another learning from Moderna.

And if you look at investments that have been successful, I think you're giving them some degrees of freedom and you've got a management team that has the right functions able to do that. For me, it's another learning from Moderna.

If you go back and look in the formative years of Moderna, the strategy was always to develop this technology of mRNA, understanding the engineering potential as much as the medical and biology potential.

If you go back and look in the formative years of Moderna, the strategy was always to develop this technology of mRNA, understanding the engineering potential as much as the medical and biology potential.

In fact, in the early days, we were more certain of the engineering benefits than we were of the medical benefits in the sense that it wasn't clear, is this going to be optimally used for rare diseases? for oncology, for vaccines, or for something that we have yet to discover, because it was all an interplay of delivery and medicine and biology. These were the big risk factors.

In fact, in the early days, we were more certain of the engineering benefits than we were of the medical benefits in the sense that it wasn't clear, is this going to be optimally used for rare diseases? for oncology, for vaccines, or for something that we have yet to discover, because it was all an interplay of delivery and medicine and biology. These were the big risk factors.

Once you could engineer the mRNA, you could do it again and again and again and again. You could do it reproducibly, cheaply. That was clear. That was the engineering benefit. But what kind of medicines could you make of it? And so I think the brilliance of Stefan and that initial team before I joined was to set up enough degrees of freedom to go and explore those opportunities in parallel.

Once you could engineer the mRNA, you could do it again and again and again and again. You could do it reproducibly, cheaply. That was clear. That was the engineering benefit. But what kind of medicines could you make of it? And so I think the brilliance of Stefan and that initial team before I joined was to set up enough degrees of freedom to go and explore those opportunities in parallel.

And so when it was clear early on that vaccine was the straightest shot to proving pharmacology of this technology, we went after vaccines. We didn't drop the other elements, but we made sure to have the right capital allocation strategy.

And so when it was clear early on that vaccine was the straightest shot to proving pharmacology of this technology, we went after vaccines. We didn't drop the other elements, but we made sure to have the right capital allocation strategy.

And I remember in the early days, the loudest conversations we had at the executive team around the executive table was around the relative capital deployment of these various different applications. I was fortunate to work with, I think, some of the smartest people I've ever met.

And I remember in the early days, the loudest conversations we had at the executive team around the executive table was around the relative capital deployment of these various different applications. I was fortunate to work with, I think, some of the smartest people I've ever met.

I've already mentioned Stefan, but we were at the time three physicians on the executive team, Lawrence Kim, who trained as a physician, but then became a finance executive at Goldman Sachs and joined us as our CFO. Today, he's a very successful investor in his own right.

I've already mentioned Stefan, but we were at the time three physicians on the executive team, Lawrence Kim, who trained as a physician, but then became a finance executive at Goldman Sachs and joined us as our CFO. Today, he's a very successful investor in his own right.

Stephen Hogue, who's the president of the company to this day, a physician who then spent years consulting with pharma and then joined as the president of the company. And Stefan, it was a very robust dialogue of where do we invest the marginal dollar? Where do we see this technology panning out? And to take agility to the extreme.

Stephen Hogue, who's the president of the company to this day, a physician who then spent years consulting with pharma and then joined as the president of the company. And Stefan, it was a very robust dialogue of where do we invest the marginal dollar? Where do we see this technology panning out? And to take agility to the extreme.

In December of 2019, when somebody started coughing in Wuhan and that first Wall Street Journal article came, the person who in the company first picked it up was the head of the vaccines. The next person who actually took it and ran with it was Stefan himself. And he saw right from the start the importance of chasing this.

In December of 2019, when somebody started coughing in Wuhan and that first Wall Street Journal article came, the person who in the company first picked it up was the head of the vaccines. The next person who actually took it and ran with it was Stefan himself. And he saw right from the start the importance of chasing this.