Chapter 1: What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
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Donald Trump went into the war with Iran thinking it would be over quickly. Now, more than seven weeks later, with a ceasefire about to end, there's still no obvious off-ramp, with uncertainty surrounding a second round of peace talks in Pakistan.
Today, a former Iran negotiator in the Trump administration, Nate Swanson, on what the US president needs to do to end the war and reopen the Strait of Homs. I'm Sam Hawley on Gadigal land in Sydney. This is ABC News Daily. Nate, we first spoke to you at the start of the war in Iran on day one. That was more than 50 days ago now. So has it been going as you would have predicted?
In some respects, yes, but in most respects, no. I mean, I think it was not totally surprising that Iran escalated so quickly based on the scope and size of the initial US and Israeli attack.
But never, I think, would I ever have guessed that it would go this long and that it would be still so messy 50 days in without a clear idea of how exactly this ends and really still even at this point what the objective is.
Now, up until July last year, you were on Trump's Iran negotiating team. So just tell me, back then, were you articulating what the risks of going into this war would be? And was he listening?
Well, I'm a career civil servant across multiple administrations and, as you noted, with the Iran team at the end. I do not have a personal relationship with President Trump by any measure. Never briefed him, unlike other presidents. But to his team, you know, when I was still there...
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Chapter 2: What were Trump's initial expectations regarding the Iran war?
I think what surprised me was really at the first outset is that Iran was able to get their own exports out for really up until the last two weeks. So for the first six weeks of the war, they basically kept traffic from the Gulf out, but their own exports of oil to China were still basically happening. So to me, that was quite shocking and it was quite significant.
And I think also, the Strait has always been this theoretical threat that the US and others have been worried about, but it was never a practical reality. And Iran made it a reality You know, almost instantly in the first, you know, 24 to 48 hours. And I think it's really proven to be in many ways much more effective than any of the other means of deterrence.
It's quite a bit more effective than the proxies. It's quite a bit more effective than their nuclear program and really even their missile program to some extent. So, I mean, it's really been a... you know, a huge boon for Iran to be able to utilize this power, this new power in ways that are really quite unforeseen and quite effective. So things can have long lasting implications, unfortunately.
And because of that Strait of Hormuz and Iran's seemingly upper hand in it, it considers that it's winning this war.
Yeah, I think there are certainly quite a few within the Iranian administration who believe they're winning the war. And I think there's definitely some merit to it, right? I mean, it's different than the US or a Western definition of winning, right? They don't need to defeat the US or defeat Israel militarily.
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Chapter 3: How has the situation evolved after seven weeks of conflict?
They just need to survive. And they're fighting an asymmetric war. So every day that goes on that... Iranian regime holds, that the Islamic Republic is still the face of the country, that's victory. And so they've done that and they've shown that there's no immediate fall coming. And in some ways they're stronger than they were. So yeah, I think that defines them in victory.
And I think they also are emboldened by the straight as this new security guarantee that they really have lacked. since Hezbollah was so thoroughly defeated in 2024. So it's a new thing. And you can understand why Iran feels that way. But at the same time, they have been pummeled militarily. I don't think there's any point in denying that.
I mean, I can't remember what the total number of strikes between US and Israel were. But it's like well over, I think, 15 or 25,000 strikes. I mean, so it is this long lasting damage that Iran has suffered. But kind of paradoxically, they've been hit so hard militarily, been pummeled militarily, but they've like re-established deterrence.
So you can understand why some in Iran feel like they've won so far.
All right. Well, Donald Trump, of course, Nate, has been acting erratically. He keeps switching from saying a deal is possible, negotiations are underway. to then saying he's going to blow up every bridge and power plant in Iran. And now, of course, again, there's these conflicting messages about this latest round of peace talks in Pakistan. What do you make of all of that?
Well, the president is unique. I can't say that this is typical U.S. president behavior in terms of how they act. You know, the implications of it on Iran are unclear. I think they don't know how to react to this. I think they ultimately feel, though, that it's a sign of weakness on the U.S. side. You
That very same day then, Iran basically didn't change their position and the president announced a peace deal by the end of the day. So from their perspective, they did nothing. Trump basically folded and basically agreed to Iran's framework for talks. It reinforces their own strategy. And that's to their advantage, I think.
Yeah, and Iran says it doesn't trust Trump. It sees these peace talks, it's reported, as a way to make it surrender. And the two sides, they're so far apart, right, when it comes to a lasting peace deal and the conditions of that.
Yeah, no, absolutely. I think Iran's not going to surrender or capitulate. I mean, that much has been made clear through... the history of U.S.-Iran relations, but really even just this, you know, 18 months or so of Trump's administration, you know, the entire premise has been that, you know, the U.S. is the dominant military power, has all the leverage Iran's capitulated, and they haven't.
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Chapter 4: What insights does Nate Swanson provide about Trump's negotiation style?
Twice now Iran has been negotiating with Wyckoff, and a war started, or an attack started. So for them, I think they perceive Vance to be... less supportive of this war, which I think is probably accurate, and it has a lot of U.S.
media reporting that, and more motivated to end this because this does not fit with the ideology that he espoused, which is kind of an America first, no silly wars abroad. So I do think J.D. Vance is uniquely positioned within the administration to want this to end. I think Iran recognizes that, and I think it's also a reflection that they just don't trust Wyckoff anymore.
Well, Nate, what's your assessment? Do both parties want an off-ramp at this point? And is there actually an off-ramp that can be offered up?
Yeah, I mean, my baseline assessment is that it is in the interest of both parties to end this war. And so I think they should be able to figure it out. There are a couple options for that. You know, I think Iran's perspective, I think they care about three things. I think they care about not getting attacked every six months or so.
And I think by establishing the Strait of Hormuz as a, you know, a deterrent, a security guarantee, I think they've actually ensured that outcome. So I think that was really important. I think second, Iran wants to monetize the Strait of Hormuz. And I think the third thing that they just kind of in the last few weeks decided they care about is Lebanon.
So they've basically made those their three key demands. In the U.S., I think our primary goal, which is to open up the Strait of Hormuz. And so, you know, of course, the Strait was open at the beginning of the war. So that's, you know, kind of makes you question what the objectives were. But I do think that is our top objective now.
Now, that is a political problem for the president if the only thing you achieve out of a war for 50 days that's caused a major crisis from the global economy is to say, hey, we ended the war in basically the same spot we started. So I think as a result of that, he wants something different that can help him create this narrative that he's accomplished something.
Part of that is degrading Iran's military, but now I think he's trying to achieve something on the nuclear front. He wants a suspension of Iran's enrichment program, and he wants to deal with the highly enriched uranium that's in Iran. So I think Iran's preference would probably be to not deal with the nuclear program, but I think they're open to dealing with it if they can get more in return.
And so I think this is where you see the haggling over the frozen assets, potential sanctions relief, things of that sort. So I do think there is a landing zone ultimately for this. But for me, the president should be judged not on necessarily what he gets, but, you know, hopefully on not overpaying.
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