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Chapter 1: What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
Welcome to the Astral Codex X podcast for the 1st of March, 2026. Title, All Lawful Use, Much More Than You Wanted to Know, a guest post by anonymous readers. This is an audio version of Astral Codex X, Scott Alexander's Substack. If you like it, you can subscribe at astralcodex10.substack.com.
Last Friday, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared AI company Anthropic a supply chain risk, the first time this designation has ever been applied to a US company.
Chapter 2: What recent designation did Secretary of War Pete Hegseth apply to Anthropic?
The trigger for the move was Anthropic's refusal to allow the Department of War to use their AIs for mass surveillance and autonomous weapons. A few hours later, Hegseth and Sam Altman declared an agreement in principle for OpenAI's models to be used in the niche vacated by Anthropic.
Altman stated that he had received guarantees that OpenAI's models wouldn't be used for mass surveillance or autonomous weapons either. But given Hegseth's unwillingness to concede these points with Anthropic, observers speculated that the safeguards in Altman's contract must be weaker, or in a worst-case scenario, completely toothless.
The debate centres on the Department of War's demand that AIs be permitted for all lawful use, in quotes. Anthropic worried that mass surveillance and autonomous weaponry would de facto fall into this category.
Hegseth and Altman have tried to reassure the public that they won't, and the parts of their agreement that have leaked to the public cite the statutes that Altman expects to constrain this category. Altman's initial statement seems to suggest additional prohibitions, but on a closer read, provides little tangible evidence of meaningful further restrictions.
Some alert ACX readers have done a deep dive into national security law to try to untangle the situation. Footnote, they wish to remain anonymous, but none are employees of any major AI lab or the Department of War. Back to the text. Their conclusion mirrors that of Anthropic and the majority of Twitter commentators. This is not enough.
Current laws against domestic mass surveillance and autonomous weapons have wide loopholes in practice. Further, many of the rules which do exist can be changed by the Department of War at any time. Although OpenAI's national security lead said that This is not how the contract law usually works, and not how the provision is likely to be enforced. Therefore, these guarantees are not helpful.
Footnote. For more, see the section Comments on OpenAI's FAQ. To learn more about the details, let's look at the law. Mass domestic surveillance. More than you wanted to know. Mass and targeted surveillance of foreigners in their foreign countries is legal.
Broadly, the courts have declined to grant standing to allow court cases to test the executive branch's position that the president has inherent powers derived from his constitutional role to authorize foreign intelligence and counterintelligence surveillance, which de facto has allowed this position to become the standard executive branch argument for lawfulness.
Targeted surveillance of Americans domestically is legal for domestic law enforcement purposes and, in narrow and usually time-limited cases, or for intelligence and counterterrorism. The surveilling agency must get the permission of a court first. Normal courts for law enforcement, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, court for intelligence.
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Chapter 3: What were the implications of OpenAI's agreement with the Department of War?
A director of national intelligence said no under oath, even though by the ordinary meaning of this question it absolutely does. It's worth noting that the NSA is a Department of War agency. Footnote, OpenAI's head of national security partnerships has made a few unclear tweets, perhaps implying that NSA might be excluded from their contract.
However, as of this writing, they have not clearly confirmed this, have made some other statements that all of DOW, which includes NSA, is in scope of their contract, and have not made any comment on other DOW intelligence agencies. There are eight others. It would be great to get further clarification on this point. Back to the text. Mass analysis of third-party data is also legal.
That is, if they buy the data from some company, let's say Facebook, they can do whatever they want with it. The main enforceable exception is certain kinds of cell phone location data, which were carved out in a 2018 Supreme Court case. Whatever the president thinks is legal may also, in certain cases, be legal.
During the War on Terror, President George W. Bush's Office of Legal Counsel claimed that he also had the inherent constitutional power as president to lawfully authorize warrantless mass collection of internet metadata and telephone call records, a dragnet scooping up American and non-American's data alike. The program was initially justified by counter-terrorism, but was far more expansive.
Footnote. To be fair, there are some genuine technical reasons for this. Because of how traffic routes across the internet's logical and physical structure, the government correctly notes that it's often hard to know before grabbing them whether a given set of internet packets is related to a foreign intelligence query or not.
But members of both parties and non-partisan inspectors general have repeatedly identified how this technical decision has enabled abuses. Back to the text. This was such a scandal within the US government that many DOJ officials threatened to resign. Even DOJ officials who didn't know what was going on threatened to resign because they assumed it was so bad.
Later, the program was moved under statutory and FISA court frameworks, until finally Congress ended it by passing the USA Freedom Act. So why should we be concerned about even lawful use of AIs for surveillance?
There are stories about each of these categories, but the most compelling is that the government can buy data from third parties, for example tech companies, cell phone companies, and surveil it as much as they want. In the past, the strongest disincentive was scale and cost.
You simply cannot look through every text message sent over the course of a month to see which ones mention a certain dissident. There are hacks. You can perform an automated search for the dissident's name, but also obvious ways around the hack. The dissident can simply not mention their own name in plain text. AI solves these scale and cost problems.
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Chapter 4: How does the concept of 'all lawful use' affect AI applications?
This is currently a lawful use of AI, and one of the ones Dario Amadei's letter says that he's worried about. As far as we can tell, Altman's contract with the Department of War doesn't contain any provisions preventing them from using ChatGPT this way. For more details on mass domestic surveillance, see this doc. Link in post. Autonomous weapons. More than you wanted to know.
Let's now turn to autonomous weapons. The authors of this section are not themselves experts, but they consulted with an expert in national security law. There is hard congressional law regulating the use of armed force in general. For example, you're not allowed to shoot innocent Americans. But to our knowledge, autonomous weapons in particular are only regulated by Department of War policy.
In particular, DoD Directive 3000.09. These policies don't impose meaningful constraints for two reasons. First, the policies are vague. Directive 3000.09 requires that autonomous weapon systems be designed to, quote, end quote.
But it doesn't define appropriate, and the US government has stated it is a flexible term, where what qualifies can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon system. The institution that decides what's appropriate is the same institution that wants to use the weapon.
Second, the Department of War can change its own policies, so any contract which only guarantees lawful use rather than hard coding some particular standard gives the DOW complete latitude to change the relevant directive, and therefore the terms, whenever they want.
Footnote, OpenAI suggests they're protected against this since their agreement specifically refers to DOD Directive 3000.09, dated 25th January 2023. But other parts of the contract refers to all lawful purposes, without specifying current law in particular, which would at best lead to contradictions if the law changes. More on this below. Back to the text.
Everyone, including Anthropic, agrees that some form of autonomous weapons will be necessary to win the wars of the future. Indeed, autonomous weapons are already being used on the battlefield in Ukraine.
But there's a wide spectrum, from humans entirely in the loop, to humans partly in the loop, to humans totally unrelated to the loop, and we might want humans involved somewhere for at least two reasons. First, humans add reliability.
For the same reason that chatbots sometimes hallucinate, and coding agents sometimes make crazy and reckless decisions that no human would consider, fully autonomous weapons might make inexplicable mistakes in their use of lethal force, with potentially devastating results. Second, and more important, human soldiers are a check on the worst abuses of authoritarians.
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Chapter 5: What loopholes exist in current national security laws regarding surveillance?
See below for comments on cloud-only deployment. Our national security law expert was also very sceptical of the idea that the DOW would have OpenAI personnel meaningfully in the loop in sensitive contexts. Will this deal enable the Department of War to use OpenAI models to conduct mass surveillance on US persons? No.
Based on our safety stack, the contract language, and existing laws that heavily restrict DOW from domestic surveillance, we are confident that this cannot happen. We will also have OpenAI personnel in the loop for additional assurance. End quote. The law does significantly restrict domestic mass surveillance, but, as explained above, leaves loopholes that may concern many readers.
Since the contract permits any surveillance allowed by the law, the contract itself does nothing further to restrict the DOW from domestic surveillance. OpenAI hasn't shared enough information about their safety stack for us to be able to evaluate that claim. Quote, What if the government just changes the law or existing DOW policies? End quote.
It is not the case that the contract consistently references current laws. The first clause says, Our understanding is that later clauses do not automatically override this first clause. OpenAI's head of national security partnerships has said, quote, We intended it to mean the law applicable at the time the contract is signed, end quote, and their CSO has also made a similar statement.
Our understanding is that this is a highly non-standard interpretation. The national security law expert we consulted agreed, and was very sceptical that the allowed and required activities would remain the same if the law changed. See also here, link in post, starting from, if OpenAI is just referencing.
Quote, How do you address the arguments Anthropic made in their blog post about their discussion with the DOW? Below is why we believe those same red lines would hold in our contract. Fully autonomous weapons, the cloud deployment surface covered in our contract would not permit powering fully autonomous weapons as this would require edge deployment. End quote.
Autonomous weapons can be steered by an AI in the cloud, just like a human can steer a drone remotely. OpenAI models do not need to be edge-deployed in order to power a fully autonomous weapon.
Overall, we can't see how any of OpenAI's claimed methods for enforcing their red lines would work, except possibly if they're allowed to implement technical safeguards that block certain lawful use, which they've shared so little about that we can't evaluate it. Boaz Barak suggests that this is the case.
If this is right, it's strange that they don't elsewhere stress this as the linchpin of their approach, or show the part of the agreement that guarantees them this ability. Further clarification on this point would be very helpful. Questions that you should be asking.
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Chapter 6: How does mass domestic surveillance of Americans operate legally?
Would OpenAI's models assist with bulk analysis of Americans' data purchased from third parties? Will OpenAI's technical safeguards intentionally block any lawful usage that goes against your red lines? Who determines if use is unlawful, in quotes? Does OpenAI have recourse if it believes use is unlawful but the DOW disagrees? What technical safeguards, in quotes, have been agreed upon?
What happens if the DOW and OpenAI disagree about what version of these safeguards are appropriate? Does the DOW have options for recourse if OpenAI provides systems with safeguards that the DOW thinks unduly reduces model performance for specific lawful purposes?
And does the agreement specify that the NSA and other intelligence agencies inside of the DOW are excluded from being able to access OpenAI models? Broader questions about the situation? What prevents the DOW from later demanding these restrictions be loosened, as it did with Anthropic? What recourse does OpenAI have if DOW violates the terms of a contract with OpenAI?
What would stop the DOW from retaliating against OpenAI, as they did with Anthropic, if the DOW and OpenAI have disagreements in the future?
Given that existing statements haven't always been clear, and Anthropic has alleged that the contract contains, quote, legalese that would allow those safeguards to be disregarded at will, end quote, we encourage you to read any responses you receive with a sceptical mindset, and ask yourself whether the response is consistent with OpenAI models being used for autonomous weapons systems or domestic mass surveillance in the colloquial sense of the terms.
This is an audio version of Astral Codex X, Scott Alexander's Substack.
If you like it, you can subscribe at astralcodex10.substack.com.
Additionally, if you like having an audio version, you can support my work on Patreon at patreon.com.sscpodcast. To reference this, please link to the original. To contact me, use astralcodexpodcast at protomail.com. Thank you for listening, and I'll speak to you next time.
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