Episode 10: Richard Kraut discusses goodness
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What is the difference between something being good for someone and being good in an absolute sense?
Hello and welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast recorded at the University of Chicago. I'm Matt Teichman. And I'm Mark Hoppard. With us today is Richard Kraut, Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University, and he is here to talk to us about goodness. Richard Kraut, welcome. Glad to be here. One of the ideas that you've been pushing lately is that there's this contrast between something being good and something being good for something else. Uh so maybe you could explain that a bit. What does a philosopher have in mind uh when he makes that contrast?
Okay. I think the notion of something being good for someone is deeply embedded in common ways of talking and it can be expressed in a number of different ways. We talk about what is in someone's interests or what benefits someone, what is advantageous, where someone's well being lies. And I think those are concepts that we constantly use as justifications for what we're doing. But I think there is also a use of the word good which sometimes has been called the absolute use of the term, in which something is said not to be good for anyone. but is simply said to be good period, no with no further terms that follow the word good. So that's again very different from another very common use of the term good, where good is followed by a noun and something is being called good
a good person, a good knife, a good movie, something as good of a kind. Those are, again, like the use of the term good for, very familiar to us and they play an important role in justifications we give. So why should I go to this movie? Because it's a good movie. Why should I study this subject? Because it will be good for you. But there is another use of the term. It appears in common sense ways of speaking and also in some philosophical theories.
Why do early 20th‑century British philosophers reject egoistic ethics and embrace absolute goodness?
And these theories or these ways of using the term imply that there's another kind of reason that we can have for doing things. It's not a matter of doing what's good for anyone or in anyone's interest. It's not a matter of um something's being a good movie or a good action or a good person, but something, according to these theories, can simply be good period. And that's what I call the absolute use of the term.
So some of the examples of this latter kind of goodness, absolute goodness, that naturally spring to mind are things like friendship, maybe, or honesty. These are certain things that we just want more of in the world. They're just good. The more of them, the better. You've argued recently, however, that that's actually a use of the word good that's very difficult to make sense of. So maybe you could say a little bit more about that. Why should we be dubious about this idea of absolute goodness?
Mm-hmm. Well, I think in the twentieth century there was a kind of rebellion against giving an important role to the notion of good for someone. Uh the people I have in mind are British moral philosophers of the early twentieth century, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, but there are many contemporary followers uh of them in the UK and the US. And they were leery of an egoistic approach to ethics, an egoistic approach according to which, in order for something to be justified, it had to be good for the person who is doing it. And so they used the term good in an absolute way, and they said that if Friendship is something that we should cultivate, that's because it is good, period. If virtue is something that is worthwhile and that we should try to inculcate again, that's not because it's good for the person who is virtuous, but simply because it is good, period.
I think that these theories overlooked another possible kind of justification. justification, it's certainly available to us to justify the things we do in terms of there being good for other people.
How can we justify moral actions by appealing to what is good for others rather than self‑interest?
So there we are still using the notion of good for, but we're not basing our reasons on self-interest. It's the interest of others. So what I'm interested in is the question can Can we give an account of what we value in terms of their being good for someone or other, not necessarily for for myself, but for society or the community?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the difference between something being good for someone and being good in an absolute sense?
0:19–2:33
2
Why do early 20th‑century British philosophers reject egoistic ethics and embrace absolute goodness?
2:33–5:04
3
How can we justify moral actions by appealing to what is good for others rather than self‑interest?
5:04–7:41
4
Is there a meaningful notion of ‘bad’ that exists independently of who is harmed?
7:41–10:19
5
What role does absolute goodness play in debates about pain, cruelty, and suffering?
10:19–13:48
6
Can friendship be valuable both as good for the participants and as an absolute good?
13:48–16:05
7
How does the concept of absolute goodness affect views on suicide and euthanasia?
16:05–19:10
8
When conflicts of interest arise, should we prioritize ‘good for’ individuals or appeal to an absolute good?
19:10–22:13
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