Episode 19: Dan Sperber discusses epistemic vigilance
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What is epistemic vigilance and why does it matter for everyday communication?
Hello and welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast recorded at the University of Chicago. I'm Matt Tagman.
And I'm Mark Hopwood.
With us today is Dan Sperber, research professor at the Jean Nico Institute and George Lurcy, visiting professor at the University of Chicago. And he's here to talk to us about epistemic vigilance. Dan Sperber, welcome. Thank you. So I guess we could begin by talking about two different approaches to what we should do with information given to us by testimony from other people as opposed to information given to us by sense experience. I guess sometimes these two approaches are called anti reductionist or reductionist. So the one approach would be something like information we receive by testimony is not something trustworthy, only information we receive by the senses is trustworthy, and maybe the other position would be something like
We are by default entitled to trust information we hear from others. What's your position on that question? Do you think we're by default entitled to trust what other people tell us is true?
And are you going to trust everything I'm going to say? Commit yourself now.
Yes.
Yes. But that's not true. We don't mean it. So so uh in fact it's not true that we do to begin with, w whether we're right or not, that we do trust everything we're told. Certainly not philosophers who are in in the business of criticizing each other all the time. But even in in ordinary life, uh there are indeed many situations where we uh trust testimony from others and also many situations where we're skeptical and others where we just distrust. So the the the two positions you were uh thinking of discussing are on the one and one view which says that testimony is indeed like the senses. It's a fundamental source of information from human beings. If you think of a young child, uh other way does she have to become a competent human being than to trust the testimony of her parents, of her caretakers, of others, uh our relying.
Reliance on information from others is not something that we can give up. We need it. And therefore, on this view, from this statement of fact that I've just made, some would infer that it's not just a fact that we rely on others that we're entitled to do so, that indeed our default attitude should be to believe others unless we have some specific reason not to, and that just as we have to rely on on our senses and we need very special circumstances to doubt the testimony of our senses. We have to rely on others and we need special circumstances not to An another view is that it's not that you should distrust testimony because that's in in general, because that would put you indeed in an impossible situation of not benefiting from the communication of others and and that's not a real option.
Uh but that you should have reason to trust those whom you trust. So there are s maybe some people who have reason to trust practically all the time, uh like people, you know, are competent and benevolent. towards you. But even then these people on some matter may speak beyond the domain of their competencies and then you should trust them less. But if you think of testimonies in general, each and every time you should have a reason to trust. You should evaluate the testimony to be entitled, to be justified in trusting it. And so that's a reductionist position. You have to reduce the information you get from testimony to reasons, to uh trust it as opposed to the non reductionist view which says a testimony is in the human condition, a way into knowledge that has just as much legitimacy as the testimony of the senses, or at least a comparable kind of strength.
So it seems like from what you've said there are two kinds of questions, at least at first, that we might ask about testimony. So one is the descriptive kind of question. How do we actually treat testimony? As a matter of fact, what do we human beings do?
How do reductionist and anti‑reductionist views differ on trusting testimony versus sense perception?
How do we treat the testimony of others? And then there's a question that might be connected to that, which is the normative or the prescriptive question.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is epistemic vigilance and why does it matter for everyday communication?
0:19–4:07
2
How do reductionist and anti‑reductionist views differ on trusting testimony versus sense perception?
4:07–7:05
3
Why do we need a default attitude of trust, and when should we look for reasons to doubt?
7:05–12:14
4
How does the concept of ‘low‑level vigilance’ explain our ability to navigate crowded streets safely?
12:14–16:21
5
What experimental evidence shows that even infants evaluate the trustworthiness of speakers?
16:21–20:14
6
How do we decide *what* to believe versus *whom* to trust when evaluating new information?
20:14–24:47
7
Why can cultural or widely shared beliefs escape our epistemic vigilance, and what risks does that create?
24:47–29:44
8
How do institutions like courts, peer‑review, and scientific norms act as large‑scale epistemic‑vigilance systems?
29:44–34:45
Speakers
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