Episode 20: Simon Critchley discusses faith
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What is the philosophical definition of faith that the hosts introduce?
Hello and welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast recorded at the University of Chicago. I'm Matt Teichman. And I'm Mark Hobbit. With us today is Simon Critchley, Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research. And he's here to talk with us about faith. Simon Critchley, welcome.
Nice to be here.
One sort of notion of faith that a lot of philosophers have is faith is the belief in something even when you don't have overwhelming evidence for it. Now do you think that's a helpful way to think about faith or do you think there are problems with it?
I don't know. How would you think about formals of faith? I mean, the give me an example of faith with evidence and without evidence. What sort of thing did you have in mind?
So a really stupid example might be faith that something is an acid because you dipped litmus paper in it and it turned a certain color, I don't know. You know, versus faith in intelligent design because look at the way the parts of uh these natural creatures fit together. It has to be the product of design. But maybe the evidence for it isn't overwhelming in the way that it is with, you know, litmus paper because whenever you dip litmus paper in acid, um, it turns whatever color it's supposed to turn.
And the former is an empirical question that we can resolve or not, right? And the latter is something which what people presuppose as a framework that's gonna make the world intelligible in some way. I don't believe in intelligent design, I suppose. I I find that sort of faith uh peculiar, I guess. I mean I think it's um there's the first distinction be to make between faith and knowledge at some level, that faith isn't something I mean by definition it's something distinct from an order of knowledge. So one's faith in the the composition of the acid is something which is resolvable em empirically, it's a knowledge question. Whereas when we're talking about faith in I don't know, religious terms or I think in ethical terms as well.
is of some different order. Which is in many ways against all the evidence. You can believe I mean I personally have faith that human beings are essentially decent. The evidence is w wildly against that. you know, the evidence would seem to point in the other direction. Human beings are are rather cruel creatures that treat each other badly. But I still have a faith in the capacity for human beings to cooperate together, organize things mutually, achieve forms of solidarity, whatever it might be. So that would be a a faith which I'd have or like to have, which would be in many ways against the majority of the evidence. And you could find some evidence to back You could say, Well look, you know, human beings are for the most part cruel and nasty but here's an example where they behaved decently to each other.
We'll select that as paradigmatic rather than the opposite.
I mean I guess another example that will come to people's minds is an example like, well, I believe that Jesus died and rose again. Mm-hmm. Not because I have some kind of special historical evidence for that, I believe it on faith.
Mm-hmm.
And the way that this kind of example seems to work out in contemporary discussions is that you have two kind of views. One view is that that kind of faith is a virtue. Like it's a good thing to hold beliefs like that on faith. And the other view takes almost entirely the opposite position. It views that kind of faith as somehow illegitimate. Mm. So the idea there would be that to believe something against all the evidence or without sufficient evidence is just intellectually irresponsible. Faith looks like the opposite of intellectual responsibility.
How does Simon Critchley distinguish between empirical faith (e.g., litmus test) and religious/ethical faith?
You've said yourself that you take at least one thing on faith, but where would you come down on this question of faith as a virtue or faith as intellectual responsibility?
Um It's difficult to generalise because if you say, you know, i that there are people that believe that Jesus was God, was Lord, was crucified and was resurrected and um I would say that is a fable, right?
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Chapters
6 chapters
1
What is the philosophical definition of faith that the hosts introduce?
0:19–3:56
2
How does Simon Critchley distinguish between empirical faith (e.g., litmus test) and religious/ethical faith?
3:56–9:38
3
Why does Critchley argue that faith can be a model for ethical commitment despite lacking evidence?
9:38–17:33
4
What role does Paul’s “faith without evidence” play in Critchley’s account of moral action?
17:33–25:46
5
How does Critchley connect the concept of faith to the motivational deficit in liberal democracy?
25:46–30:06
6
What political alternatives (e.g., anarchism, local solidarity) does Critchley suggest arise from a faith‑based motivation?
30:06–32:45
Speakers
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