Episode 36: Robert van Rooij discusses vagueness

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Elucidations 32 min 1 speaker 8 chapters transcribed 2 hours ago
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What is the main topic discussed in this episode?

Unknown 0:00
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Matt Teichman 0:36
Hello and welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast ordinarily recorded at the University of Chicago, but which today is being brought to you from Amsterdam.

What is vagueness and why do philosophers study it?

Matt Teichman 0:44
With me today is Robert von Roy, Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Language at the Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation at the University of Amsterdam. And he is here to talk to us about vagueness. Robert Von Roy, welcome.
Robert van Rooij 0:59
Thank you.
Matt Teichman 1:01
So usually when we think about vagueness, we sort of think about not really being specific about what you're saying, making sort of uh claims that are unclear. This is the sort of thing we associate with like politicians, uh political rhetoric. But in general, philosophers of language and linguists are after something a bit more specific when they talk about vagueness. So uh what is it that we're interested in as philosophers looking at vagueness?
Robert van Rooij 1:24
Yes, philosophers normally characterize vagueness by two properties. First, that it gives rise to a particular paradox, known as the Soridus paradox, and second, and maybe that's the first thing that comes to mind, that it gives rise to borderline cases, that is, that it's not clear for some particular individuals whether they satisfy a predicate or not satisfy a predicate.

How do borderline cases like “tall” illustrate vagueness?

Robert van Rooij 1:48
So that is about vagueness of predicates. So that gives rise to borderline cases, or rather that there are no particular boundaries between whether you're in something or whether you're not in something.
Matt Teichman 2:01
Okay, so a borderline case then is an example of something where it's not really clear whether it either has a property or lacks a property. So what would be an example of like a borderline case?
Robert van Rooij 2:15
Well, let's think of adjectives in the first because adjectives are the kind of uh words where vagueness is most obvious. So let's think of an adjective like tall. But in Holland you're tall if you're like uh more than one point nine meters. Well, certainly you're certainly not tall if you're below one sixty, below one seventy. But if you are, let's say, one point eighty, then you're neither clearly tall nor not clearly not tall or not clearly short. And that will be a case of borderline tallness. But many people are borderline tall because one hundred eighty is like the average uh tallness that men in the Netherlands at least have. But it can also be more significant, for instance, um when do you count something as a human being?
Robert van Rooij 3:06
So this is important for abortion. But more straightforwardly, suppose that you have

What is the Sorites (paradox of the heap) paradox and how does it arise?

Robert van Rooij 3:12
a local ordinance that bans vehicles from public park. So now of course then it's important what does vehicle mean? Well it's clear that This local um ordinance forbids cars or autos to be there. It doesn't forbid peanut butter, but what about bicycles, for instance? So this would be another example of a borderline case.
Matt Teichman 3:31
Yeah, and already there's a an incredible amount of variety in these examples. I mean so in the case of tall, there's sort of a continuum we can imagine. People can be anywhere from this height to this height. And at some point as somebody's height increases and increases and increases, at some point maybe we want to say that they're tall. But then in these other cases, you know, the example of what counts as a vehicle. Well do roller skates count as a vehicle? Uh probably not, I guess. But a bike, yeah, a bike is sort of like a vehicle. there maybe it's harder to imagine this, you know, one scale that you're ascending up and at some point something becomes a vehicle. It's not clear that we could arrange
Matt Teichman 4:05
all the different modes of transportation on a continuum from non vehicle to vehicle. So it's actually pretty extraordinary how pervasive this phenomenon of vagueness is. It seems to reach into all different um categories we put things in.
Robert van Rooij 4:16
Yes, it's not only uh adjectives. Adjectives are um the most natural I think, but I mean nouns give rise to uh vagueness as well.

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