Episode 62: Sally Sedgwick discusses Hegel’s critique of Kant

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Elucidations 30 min 1 speaker 8 chapters transcribed 2 hours ago
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What is the main topic discussed in this episode?

Matt Teichman 0:00
Hey, Matt Techman here from Elucidations. Before we get going today, I just thought I'd ask if you're a fan of the show, to maybe go to our iTunes page and leave a rating and a review, and that way more people can discover it. Alright, thanks.
Matt Teichman 0:32
Hello, welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast recorded at the University of Chicago. I'm Matt Tykman. And I'm Jamie Edwards. With us today is Sally Sedgwick. Liberal Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Affiliated Professor of Germanic Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago. And she's here to talk with us about Hegel's critique of Kant. Sally Sedgwick, welcome. Hello there. So the philosopher Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy kind of departs from this distinction between a formal and an empirical theory of ethics.

What is Kant’s formal versus empirical theory of ethics?

Matt Teichman 1:09
So what does Kant mean by that exactly? What's the difference
Sally Sedgwick 1:13
Well, I'll just talk about Kant's case, 'cause that's the one that I know best. So a formal theory obviously is going to have some formal elements, and in Kant's case, the supreme law of morality is, he would say, formal. And what that means for him is that it derives from pure reason versus deriving from experience, meaning our observation of human behavior. the law for Kant has its origin in pure reason and is therefore formal. So the supreme moral principle for Kant is formal in this respect. And then I would add that the subject who is responsible for this law, that is the rational person, the rational self, is formal in a certain respect as well, in that Kant says that the law derives from that part of ourselves which is capable of stepping outside time.
Sally Sedgwick 2:12
Time essentially. So he's committed to the view that each of us as a rational agent has a very special kind of freedom, and it is a freedom to initiate a causal series from a standpoint that is outside time. So the moral law itself is formal, has its origin and reason, and human agents have this formal aspect on his view, namely we are capable of this very special kind of causal power. I should add that Kant doesn't think that we can know that we have this kind of agency, but he thinks that we have to think of ourselves as having this kind of agency if morality is to be possible.
Matt Teichman 2:55
So the point of saying that the most basic moral principle is formal rather than empirical is to say that it's not like you know, we were born and then we had a bunch of experience growing up in the world and then we like learn from our experience or something that this is the most basic moral law. Uh it's more like it was built somehow into our faculty of reasoning in the first place.
Um
Sally Sedgwick 3:17
Sort of like an innate idea.

How does Kant define the supreme moral law and human dignity?

Sally Sedgwick 3:19
Something like uh I think it's fair to say that Kant is in certain respects an innatist, that he thinks that we do have ideas or concepts that are in us already independent of any experience. And because those ideas are independent of experience, they have a validity that sort of transcends the different experiences of different Peoples. So it's precisely because the supreme law of morality is a priori that it's not just valid for some persons and not others, or some cultures are not others, some historical periods but not others. Precisely because it is a law of human reason, its validity extends to all rational natures, including all rational human natures.
Matt Teichman 4:08
That's interesting. So then I guess maybe part of the point here is that In order for the most fundamental moral principle to like objectively hold and for the same one to hold of all different people who have all different experiences, it has to be independent of experience. Seems like maybe there's a connection being drawn there.
Sally Sedgwick 4:22
There's definitely a connection. I mean Kant I think he's looking for a principle that has this very special kind of validity. Again, it's not just valid for some people but not others, you know, white people but not blacks, men but not women, Christians but not not Muslims, etcetera, etcetera, but it has this very special status of being universally and necessarily valid, as he puts it. And the only way it could possibly have that kind of status is for its origin to be something other than human experience.

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