Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part One)

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Recorded15 Jul 2019

Publisherpartiallyexaminedlife.libsyn.com ↗

Handlerec:5514666

Show notes

On Hilary Putnam's "The Nature of Mental States" (1973). What is the mind? Functionalist theories identify the mental with not with the brain exactly, but with something the brain does. So some other creature without a brain (maybe a computer) might be able to do that same thing if it could duplicate the structure of what our brains do. Is this a satisfying account of the mind? Please support PEL!

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