PDB Afternoon Bulletin | June 30th, 2026: Can Moscow Still Achieve Victory?
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It's Tuesday, the 30th of June. Welcome to the PDB Afternoon Bulletin. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. Now, as mentioned during this morning's PDB, here at the President's Daily Brief, we decided we'll take a couple of days off from the grind of the daily news cycle to bring you a look at some of the overall geopolitical issues and top-line questions that sometimes get lost in the constant rush of the fast-breaking headlines. The PDB team, of course, is keeping an eye on breaking news and will update as warranted. But for just two or three days, we thought we'd turn our focus to the bigger picture questions to present a few special intelligence briefings, a respite, if you will, from the daily news cycle.
And today's question for this afternoon's bulletin is one that's become increasingly difficult to answer as the war in Ukraine drags into its fifth year. And that question is, well, can Russia still win? At first glance, the answer might seem somewhat obvious. After all, more than four years have passed since Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine back in February of 2022. The conflict has consumed hundreds of thousands of lives, reshaped European security and transformed Russia's relationship with the West. Yet, despite all of that, the war remains unresolved. Russia controls significant portions of Ukrainian territory, yet Ukraine remains independent and continues to resist.
And Russia has not achieved the objectives that it set for itself at the beginning of the conflict, which raises a fundamental question. How do we evaluate success in a war that's become defined by endurance, by a World War I style of grinding, slow, costly gains, rather than dramatic battlefield breakthroughs? Well, to answer that, we first need to go back to the beginning. When Russian tanks first rolled across the border in February of 2022, the conventional wisdom at the time was that Moscow possessed nearly every meaningful advantage. Putin and, frankly, countless pundits and analysts expected Russian forces to be in Kyiv within weeks, if not days. After all, Russia's economy was significantly larger than Ukraine's.
Its military was larger, better equipped, and widely regarded as one of the most capable fighting forces in the world. It possessed thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, a powerful air force, long-range missile capabilities, and a substantial advantage in manpower. Now, the initial invasion was built around speed. Russian forces pushed toward Kiev from multiple directions. Airborne troops attempted to seize Kiev infrastructure. Armored columns raced toward the capital. The expectation seemed to be that Ukraine's government would collapse, resistance would fragment, and Moscow would quickly establish a friendly regime. Instead, almost everything for the Kremlin went wrong. Ukrainian forces fought far more effectively than many observers anticipated.
President Zelensky remained in Kiev. Russian logistics broke down. Command and control problems emerged. Western countries rapidly supplied military aid, intelligence support, and economic assistance. Within weeks, the assumptions that had shaped the opening phase of the war began to unravel. Russian forces ultimately withdrew from northern Ukraine and abandoned their effort to seize Kyiv. What had initially appeared to be a war of fast maneuvers gradually evolved into a grinding war of attrition focused largely on eastern and southern Ukraine. And as the nature of the war changed, so did the balance of advantages. Russia still possessed significant strengths. It retained a larger population, a larger economy and a greater ability to absorb casualties.
It's maintained substantial military industrial capacity and continued producing weapons, of course, ammunition and military equipment, despite extensive sanctions. But many of the advantages that seemed overwhelming back in February of 2022 proved less decisive than expected. Ukraine demonstrated a remarkable capacity to mobilize its population.
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