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War in Iran is making Donald Trump weaker—and angrier
By diminishing the president’s political superpowers, his reckless campaign may make him more dangerous
Mar 19th 2026|6 min read
NEVER BET against Donald Trump. No politician can defy political gravity like the man whose supporters stormed the Capitol on January 6th 2021, only for him to be re-elected in 2024 with a bigger share of the vote. And yet it is hard to imagine a crisis more precisely engineered to intercept the trajectory of his presidency than his ill-judged, heedless war against Iran. Even a short war will alter the course of his second term. One that lasts months could bring it crashing to earth.
The reason is that the fight against Iran diminishes Mr Trump’s three political superpowers: his ability to impose his own reality on the world, his remorseless use of leverage and his dominion over the Republican Party. Even without Iran, the potency of these Trumpian strengths was likely to wane after the midterm elections. Wars accelerate change.
Start with Trump v Reality. In politics, the president has shown a remarkable ability to twist facts and, sure enough, he insists that he has already triumphed in Iran. Yet the war tells a truth of its own. Iran’s regime cannot win in any conventional sense. But despite widespread destruction of infrastructure and the assassinations of senior leaders—including the security chief, Ali Larijani—Iran’s regime survives for now and its 400kg or so of near-bomb-ready uranium remains at large.
What is more, Iran is waging its own parallel war against the global energy industry. As it strikes shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the infrastructure of its neighbours, the markets are keeping score. With Brent **crude spiking to more than $110 a barrel **on March 18th, following an Iranian missile attack on a Qatari natural-gas hub, the regime will conclude that its strategy is working.
If anything, time is on Iran’s side. America and Israel will gradually run out of useful targets to strike from the air, or run low on interceptor batteries to see off Iranian weapons. By contrast, Iran appears still to have plenty of drones. For as long as it restricts traffic in the strait, oil prices will climb and the damage to the world economy will grow.
Mr Trump’s second superpower is leverage. Now that other countries’ leaders have come to expect rough treatment, they are learning how to resist. When the president called on America’s allies to help open the strait, warning that NATO faced a “very bad” future if they refused, they turned him down. He quickly reversed course, pretending he had never needed help.
Likewise,** Iran is opposing Mr Trump by accumulating leverage against him. **In recent days it has signalled that it will grant safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz to ships from friendly countries—a sign that it means to use access as a bargaining tool. Even if Mr Trump wants to end the war, Iran could continue to fire at ships. If the waterway remains closed until the end of April, the oil price could reach $150 a barrel.
Given that leverage, Iran may hold out for more than just a return to the status quo before the war. It may ask for sanctions to be lifted, or an American commitment to abandon some bases in the Middle East or to restrain Israel. If recession looms in America and stockmarkets start to fall, would Mr Trump escalate by, say, seizing Kharg island, home to Iran’s export terminals? Or would he buckle?
The answer depends partly on the last of his powers: his hold on his party. Mr Trump was elected on promises to spare voters from war and inflation. So far, 13 American service personnel have died; ground operations inside Iran, to recover that uranium, or on Kharg would put many more in danger. Average prices of petrol and diesel have reached $3.88 and $5.09 a gallon, compared with $3.11 and $3.72 at Mr Trump’s inauguration. Republican support for the war is strong, but softening. A vocal faction of MAGA, notably Tucker Carlson (interviewed on “The Insider”, our video show, this week), talks of betrayal.
In private many elected Republicans are seething. Mr Trump’s** failure to heed warnings** about the Strait of Hormuz is typical of his contempt for strategy and his hubris in thinking he knows better than people who really do. Republicans are now highly likely to lose control of the House in the midterm elections in November. Their chances of losing the Senate too have risen by ten points, to about 50%. The worse the defeat, the lamer a duck the president will be and the less influence he will have over who inherits the party.
Were the war to drag on, leading to very high oil prices and tumbling stockmarkets, Mr Trump could seek a way out and look for a win somewhere else—in, say, Cuba. Markets would doubtless register relief if the fighting stopped. But Mr Trump is not in full control of this war. Iran’s attack on the gas hub in Qatar shows it still has cards to play. And even if the fighting ended tomorrow it could take four to six weeks to restore oil production, four to eight weeks to settle oil markets and two months to normalise shipping. The risk of renewed Iranian action would remain. Prices may stay high for months. Every day they do weakens the president.
Mr Trump’s politics depends on the strength that comes from winning. If he seems a loser, expect him to exact retribution. A weaker president could become a more dangerous one.
Tanking
Mr Trump is freest to act abroad. He may abandon NATO. He may cut Ukraine loose to punish Europe. He could bully Latin America in the name of fighting crime and drugs. He may demand money for defending Japan and South Korea. He will be maximalist on tariffs. Even if he does not succeed, that will further erode America’s alliances, to the glee of China and Russia.
But Mr Trump is also liable to lash out at home. He has already endorsed the idea of withholding broadcasting licences from media outlets that criticise the war.** He wants the Federal Reserve to slash rates, but his war makes that less likely**—expect further clashes with the central bank. He could target perceived enemies or send immigration agents to more Democratic-run cities. He could threaten to meddle in the midterms, either as theatre to rile his opponents, or because he intends to influence the results. It is hard to see how Mr Trump ends up a winner in Iran. Be warned: he makes a very bad loser. ■
伊朗戰事正削弱唐納·川普——且讓他愈發憤怒
由於總統的政治「超能力」正在消減，他那魯莽的軍事行動可能使他變得更加危險
2026年3月19日 | 閱讀時間 5 分鐘
永遠不要賭唐納·川普會輸。沒有哪位政治人物能像他一樣無視「政治重力」：他的支持者曾在 2021 年 1 月 6 日衝擊國會大廈，但他卻能在 2024 年以更高的得票率重新當選。然而，很難想像還有什麼危機，能比這場判斷失誤且不計後果的對伊戰爭，更精準地攔截他總統任期的上升軌跡。即使是一場短暫的戰爭，也將改變他第二任期的走向；若戰事持續數月，則可能讓他摔得粉身碎骨。
究其原因，對伊戰爭削弱了川普的三大政治超能力：他將自身現實強加於世界的能力、對籌碼（leverage）冷酷無情的使用，以及他對共和黨的統治力。即便沒有伊朗問題，這些「川式強項」的效力在期中選舉後本就可能轉弱，而戰爭則加速了這種變化。
首先看「川普對抗現實」。在政治領域，這位總統展現了扭曲事實的驚人能力，果不其然，他堅稱自己已在伊朗取得勝利。然而，這場戰爭本身就訴說著真相。伊朗政權在任何傳統意義上都無法獲勝，但儘管基礎設施遭到大規模破壞、高層領導人（包括安全首長阿里·拉里賈尼）遭到暗殺，伊朗政權目前依然倖存，且其約 400 公斤近乎武器級的濃縮鈾仍下落不明。
更甚者，伊朗正針對全球能源產業發動一場平行戰爭。隨著伊朗襲擊荷姆茲海峽的航運及鄰國的基礎設施，市場正在「記帳」。3 月 18 日，在伊朗飛彈襲擊卡達天然氣樞紐後，布蘭特原油價格飆升至每桶 110 美元以上，該政權將據此認定其策略正發揮效用。
如果說有什麼差別，那就是時間站在伊朗這一邊。美國與以色列能從空中打擊的有效目標終將耗盡，或者用來攔截伊朗武器的防空飛彈電池將會短缺。相比之下，伊朗似乎仍有充足的無人機。只要伊朗持續限制海峽交通，油價就會攀升，對世界經濟的損害也會日益擴大。
川普的第二項超能力是「籌碼」。既然其他國家的領導人已經習慣了被粗暴對待，他們正學會如何抵抗。當總統要求美國盟友協助開放海峽，並警告若拒絕則北約（NATO）將面臨「非常糟糕」的未來時，他們拒絕了。川普隨即改弦易轍，假裝自己從未需要過幫助。
同樣地，伊朗也正透過累積對抗川普的籌碼來反擊。近日，伊朗示意將允許友好國家的船隻安全通過荷姆茲海峽——這跡象表明它有意將航行權作為談判工具。即使川普想結束戰爭，伊朗仍可繼續攻擊船隻。若該水道持續封閉至 4 月底，油價可能觸及每桶 150 美元。
有了這項籌碼，伊朗要求的可能不只是回到戰前的現狀。它可能要求解除制裁，或要求美國承諾撤離部分中東基地，或限制以色列。如果美國經濟陷入衰退且股市開始下跌，川普會選擇升級行動（例如奪取伊朗出口終端所在地——哈爾克島），還是會屈服認輸？
答案部分取決於他的最後一項權力：他對政黨的掌控。川普當年是憑藉「讓選民免於戰爭與通膨」的承諾當選的。到目前為止，已有 13 名美軍官兵喪生；而在伊朗境內發動地面行動以回收濃縮鈾，或進攻哈爾克島，將使更多人陷入險境。目前汽油和柴油的平均價格已達到每加侖 3.88 美元和 5.09 美元，而川普就職時僅為 3.11 美元和 3.72 美元。共和黨對戰爭的支持依然強勁，但正在鬆動。MAGA 陣營中聲音響亮的一派——尤其是本週接受我們影音節目《知情者》（The Insider）採訪的塔克·卡森——已經開始談論「背叛」。
私底下，許多共和黨民選官員正怒火中燒。川普未能聽取有關荷姆茲海峽的警告，這典型地反映了他對策略的輕視，以及那種自認比專業人士更懂的傲慢。共和黨現在極有可能在 11 月的期中選舉中失去眾議院的控制權；失去參議院的機率也上升了 10 個百分點，達到約 50%。敗得愈慘，總統就會變成愈弱勢的「跛腳鴨」，對誰能繼承黨內大位的影響力也就愈小。
若戰爭拖延下去，導致油價居高不下且股市大跌，川普可能會尋求退路，並在其他地方（例如古巴）尋找一場「勝利」。若戰事停止，市場無疑會感到寬慰。但川普並未完全掌控這場戰爭。伊朗對卡達天然氣樞紐的攻擊顯示它手中仍有牌可打。即便戰事明天結束，恢復石油產量可能需要四到六週，穩定石油市場需要四到八週，航運正常化則需兩個月。伊朗重新採取行動的風險依然存在。高物價可能維持數月，而每一天的物價高漲都在削弱總統。
川普的政治生命取決於「勝利」所帶來的實力。如果他看起來像個輸家，預期他將會採取報復行動。一個更虛弱的總統可能會變得更加危險。
兵敗如山倒
川普在外交事務上最能隨心所欲。他可能會放棄北約，可能切斷對烏克蘭的支持以懲罰歐洲，可能以打擊犯罪與毒品為名霸凌拉美各國。他可能要求日本和南韓支付防禦費用，並在關稅問題上採取極限施壓。即便這些行動未能成功，也將進一步侵蝕美國的同盟關係，令中俄兩國竊喜。
但川普也傾向於在國內撒氣。他已經支持「撤銷批評戰爭的媒體機構廣播執照」的構想。他希望聯準會（Fed）降息，但他的戰爭讓這變得更不可能——預期他將與中央銀行發生更多衝突。他可能鎖定所謂的敵人，或向更多民主黨執政的城市派遣移民官員。他甚至可能威脅干預期中選舉，或作為激怒對手的戲碼，或是真想影響選舉結果。很難預見川普如何在伊朗問題上成為贏家。請注意：他是一個非常輸不起的人。
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