1DCA Division 4 Oral Argument - 2025/12/09 - Dec 09, 2025

argument

1DCA Division 4 Oral Argument - 2025/12/09

California First District Court of Appeal 1h 25m 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

▲ 0

Transcript

jump: chapters · find in transcript

Transcript

Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.

Why did the court honor Clerk Channing Hu’s 42‑year service at the start of the hearing?

Justice Streeter 0:28

We also, as you may see, have today Justice Streeter very briefly. Before we begin our count, or you can be seated, sorry. Before we begin, I'd appreciate your indulgence as I say a couple of words. If you've been in this courtroom any time since 1983, chances are that you've seen our clerk, Channing Hu. After more than 42 years, today is Mr. Hu's last oral argument calendar with the First District Court of Appeal. So my colleagues and I just wanted to take a moment to publicly acknowledge his extraordinary dedication to our court and the entire legal community. His efforts in keeping Division IV running smoothly have made him a truly incomparable public servant. And we are deeply, deeply grateful for his service.

Justice Streeter 1:21

So thank you, Mr. Hu, for your work on our behalf.

1:27

Thank you.

Justice Streeter 1:27

All right. Thank you, Justice Streeter. He'll be back later. So with that, let me call line one, which is Reed versus Superior Court. And if we can begin with appearances from both counsel. Thank you. Alia

Alia Naqvi 1:44

Naqvi for

Justice Streeter 1:45

the petitioner, Mr. Reid.

Alia Naqvi 1:48

And Lisa Ashley Ott for the people.

What are the main statutory‑interpretation arguments in Reed v. Superior Court regarding Health & Safety Code §11395 and mental‑health diversion?

Justice Streeter 1:50

Okay. And let me turn to counsel for Mr. Reid. Do you wish to reserve any of your 15 minutes for rebuttal?

Alia Naqvi 1:57

Yes, please. About two minutes.

Justice Streeter 1:59

Okay. You may proceed.

Alia Naqvi 2:01

Thank you. May it please the court, this case represents a question of statutory representation, interpretation, with statewide implications. Whether the newly passed health and safety code section 11395, the treatment mandated felony act, silently repeals or restricts mental health diversion under section 1001.36. The trial court ruled that it did, thereby treating section 11395 as a categorical bar to diversion. Today, I will be addressing three main points in my argument. First, the plain language of Section 11395 is clear and unambiguous and makes it so the two laws are readily reconcilable. Second, Section 11395 operates only in a post-conviction sphere and does not conflict with pre-plea proceedings whatsoever.

Alia Naqvi 2:53

Third, those who are facing prosecution under the new law are not all eligible or suitable for mental health diversion. And therefore, the new law does not create surplusage. Are

Justice Streeter 3:05

you alluding to the trial court's comment about the Venn diagram? Yes. OK.

Alia Naqvi 3:12

A little over a year ago, California voters passed Proposition 36. known as the Homelessness, Drug Addiction, and Theft Reduction Act. In doing so, they enacted Health and Safety Code section 11395. Repeat offenders could now face heightened penalties and felony charges for mere possession. What this new law didn't do is address any sort of pre-plea proceedings. The text of the statute did not mention pre-plea diversion, did not offer pre-plea diversion, and did not bar pre-plea diversion. Quite simply, it just does not address diversion at all. Therefore, a plain language reading of the law indicates that there is no conflict with diversion whatsoever. The court should only look to voter intent behind the new law if there is ambiguity on the face of the text.

Alia Naqvi 4:05

The law is unambiguous. Even if the court did consider other materials, such as voter initiatives or the ballot itself, there is no indication that the voters were ever asked to decide the question of whether or not courts should lose their ability to divert mentally ill defendants under Proposition 36. If the enactors of the provisions had intended to bar defendants' eligibility for any form of pre-plea diversion, they would have done so. The language would have explicitly said so, and it does not. Based on the plain language of the text, it should then be presumed that the electorate intended for section 11395 to coexist in harmony with pre-existing statutory law. This includes the availability of diversion under 1001.36.

Alia Naqvi 4:56

In addition, the text of Section 1001.36, the statute governing the availability of mental health diversion, does not address Proposition 36. The statute delineates between divertable and non-divertable offenses. For example, among the non-divertable offenses listed in this section, the text expressly makes registrable offenses under Section 290, murder and rape, as non-divertable offenses.