1DCA Division 4 Oral Argument - 2026/04/14 - Apr 14, 2026
argument1DCA Division 4 Oral Argument - 2026/04/14
California First District Court of Appeal
32 min
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What parties appeared and what were their roles at the start of the oral argument?
Okay, good morning uh to council. Let's call the first and only case on our calendar, Western Manufacturing. Sorry, Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association et al. versus City of Santa Rosa et al. Could we begin with appearances from council, beginning with council for uh the Western parties?
Yes, good morning, Your Honor. I'm Paul Beard and I represent Propellants Western Manufactured Housing as well as Rincone Valley Mobile Home Park.
Mm. And for the respondents.
Yes, good morning, Your Honors. My name is Nathan Putney and I represent the respondent parties, City of Santa Rosa, Department of Housing and Community Services of the City of Santa Rosa, and Megan Bassinger in her official capacity for those departments.
Okay. And let me turn back to counsel for the appellants at this time. Uh how much, if any, of your 15 minutes would you like to reserve for rebuttal this morning?
I'd like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.
Okay. You're gonna have to keep track uh for yourself, uh and I will do the same on my end. You may proceed. Hold it.
Uh thank you and good morning again, your honors. May it please the court. This case uh begins and ends uh with the legislature's clear choice of the benchmark for defining uh the relevant rental price as to occupied rent controlled. mobile home spaces. For that narrow category of tenancy. Penal Code Section three hundred ninety six doesn't define rental price by the last rent charged or some other fixed Хісторика снапшот as the statute does for other categories of tenancy. Rather it defines it as the amount Авториз удал рент контрол орденс. And in our view, what this means is that during the relevant twenty seventeen to twenty twenty one emergency. The city's local rent control ordinance remained the operative dynamic benchmark for this category of tenancy.
Section three hundred ninety six and its ten percent. Ренка дина репласт the ordinance. That interpretation follows not just from the plain meaning of section three ninety six Subsection J L D, which defines rental price. In the context of mobile home parks. It also follows from section three hundred and ninety six K Which disavows preemption of any local ordinance prohibiting the same or similar conduct. And that really does make sense. Фром а полісі перспекти. There's no need for two different schemes to regulate the same conduct. And I'd like to just spend a moment on this point, which in our view the respondents brief doesn't adequately address.
I wanna before you before you launch into that, I wanna ask you a question.
How much time did each side reserve for rebuttal and why does it matter?
You say that that the rental control rent control ordinance and three ninety-six address the same or similar conduct. I suppose That's only true though if if you define the conduct as the setting of rent prices or the increase of rent prices, because it seems to me that what 396 is talking about is a you know, an anti price gouging uh uh measure in the context of one very specific circumstance, a declared state of emergency. And the rent control ordinance is like a year over year, you know, the normal state of affairs, you can't go more than a hundred percent over the CPI, you know, with the with the six percent cap overlaid up upon that, right? So I guess Is your theory that they define I'm sorry, that they address similar conduct writ large in terms of the setting of prices for rental homes?
Justice Brown, I I would say that more specifically our theory is that it that it regul that both both laws regulate similar conduct where the similar conduct Is Екcessів інкризи Unfair advantage greatly increasing. Those terms come from subsection A. Of three ninety six. And also arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable rent increases, which is the language from the the rent control ordinance. So I would say that both the conduct at issue, and I agree, Justice uh Brown, that it kind of depends on how you define the purposes of these two laws. It's what level of generality.
Yeah, how how broadly one allows
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What parties appeared and what were their roles at the start of the oral argument?
0:00–2:56
2
How much time did each side reserve for rebuttal and why does it matter?
2:56–7:02
3
What is the core dispute over Penal Code § 396’s definition of “rental price”?
7:02–10:52
4
How does the City of Santa Rosa’s rent‑control ordinance interact with § 396?
10:52–16:37
5
Why does the court consider the “fair return” petition mechanism relevant here?
16:37–23:33
6
What legislative history explains the narrow carve‑out for occupied mobile‑home spaces?
23:33–28:53
7
How does the length of a state of emergency affect rent‑control calculations?
28:53–32:07
8
What conclusions did the judges reach and what are the next steps?
32:07–32:10
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