1DCA Division 4 Oral Argument - 2026/04/28 - Apr 28, 2026
argument1DCA Division 4 Oral Argument - 2026/04/28
California First District Court of Appeal
1h 5m
3 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What are the initial appearances and procedural setup for the Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology case?
Good morning and please be seated. I think our first couple of cases, we have only remote appearances, if I'm not mistaken.
Do we have both counsel for the Toothman versus Redwood toxicology case? OK, great. I'm going to ask Madam Clerk, would it be possible to turn off the transcription that's happening at the bottom of the screen? It's a little distracting.
Okay, well, let's go ahead and get started with appearances from both counsel on line one, which is Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology, beginning with counsel for the appellant, Redwood.
Yes, good morning. May it please the court, Michelle Bielke for appellant, Redwood Toxicology.
Okay, and counsel for the respondent, please.
Good morning. Kyle Nordrehaug on behalf of the respondent. Thank you.
Okay. And let me turn back to counsel for the appellant. Did you wish to reserve any of your 15 minutes for rebuttal?
Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. I wish to reserve five minutes for rebuttal if it's necessary.
Okay. And you should keep track of the time on your own because you won't be able to see our clock here. Okay. You may proceed.
Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. Appellant wants to start with thanking the court for the tentative and the intent of appellant is to focus the argument on some of the issues that are raised in the tentative agreement. And the first issue that the appellant would like to address with your honors is that the tentative holds that the burden shifting analysis under Gamboa and Rosenthal does not apply to the facts of this case. And in support of this argument, the court cites to both Kinder and Jones. Appellant respectfully disagrees with the reason and the tentative. Appellant's position is that the burden shifting analysis in Gamboa and also this district's precedent in both Ayer and Bannister that all of those decisions, in fact, do find that in a petition to compel arbitration,
that the moving party's initial burden on a motion to compel is to establish or put forth evidence in the record that there's an agreement to arbitrate that is signed by the opposing party. Specifically on page 165 of Gamboa, the court states the moving party can meet its initial burden by attaching the agreement bearing the opposing party's signature. You
mean it's irrelevant who's on the other side of the agreement? If the plaintiff has ever signed an arbitration agreement in their life, if you can find that somewhere, you can just put that in and then switch the burden?
So Your Honor, under the controlling precedent, that initial burden is met and then it shifts to the opposing party to put forth its defense. So under those circumstances, then the defense would be whether I'm not a party or I'm not a signatory or it's not within the scope of this case. But in the controlling precedent, the initial burden in a petition to compel arbitration is met,
I don't know what you mean by controlling, because it seems like Jones and Kinder are directly on point. They address this specific issue. If you're not a party to the agreement, it's part of your initial burden to show that you're a party to the agreement.
Well, in looking at the Kinder case, I'll start with the Kinder case, Your Honor. In looking at the Kinder case, the court did in fact apply the burden shifting analysis set forth in Gamboa. And they determined ultimately that the party did not meet its burden, but it did apply the burden shifting analysis. And they found that it did not meet its burden because it could not show that the opposing party had in fact signed the agreement. So it's our position that the Kinder case actually supports the fact that the burden shifting analysis does in fact apply. And if you
look at the- You have the information to show that you were a party to this arbitration agreement. It makes very little sense to put the burden on the other side to show in the first instance that the person moving to compel arbitration is a party to the agreement. I mean, that is entirely within the moving party's control and knowledge. What sense does that make to put it on the other side to show that issue?
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Chapters
3 chapters
1
What are the initial appearances and procedural setup for the Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology case?
0:01–15:39
2
How does the appellant argue that the burden‑shifting analysis under Gamboa and Rosenthal applies to this case?
15:39–57:47
3
Is Redwood Toxicology bound by the arbitration agreement, and what evidence supports that claim?
57:47–1:04:57
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