Arash Azizi

The clarifying fact is that

even most powerful people in the regime, powerful factions of the regime, don't belong to these hardliners.

Because if the Revolutionary Guards, the IRGC, which to be clear, are basically the country, I mean, they're running most of the economy, much of the security, much of the politics,

they really are the regime in many ways.

Although with the caveat that they're not one thing, they're kind of decentralized themselves.

But if they really took this hardline attitude, that would be just the attitude of the regime.

But it's kind of actually the flip side, i.e.

these hardliners are a minority, and the regime's main bodies are actually pretty cohesive.

So this myth of, oh, we don't know who to make a deal with, is not really true, because they've been pretty impressive and banded together.

And what are some of the evidence I have for this, right?

You should always ask people for evidence, by the way, because there's always analysis always, and you ask them, okay, how do we know this, right?

And it goes to one leak from one outlet, right?

Okay, but what is my solid analysis?

Taslim, for example, which we know is run by the IRGC, has attacked the hardliners, front-on attacked the hardliners.

And we saw there was a sort of a letter in the parliament, 261 MPs signed it in support of the negotiating team, and the hardliners didn't sign it.

Some hardliners didn't sign it.

So yes, there is infighting, but there is significant regime cohesion for their own interests.

They realize that if they have too much infighting, they'll collapse.

So they're banded together.

And the hardliners are a minority.