Ben Cohen

Not only did Hamas pay absolutely no heed to those demonstrations, unsurprisingly, they went in their arrow unit, which is their internal security, went in pretty much, I mean, all guns blazing is a literal description, not a figure of speech.

And they went in and crushed these demonstrations.

Again, then you get to the ceasefire last October.

What's the first thing that Hamas does?

It basically goes to get revenge against these different militias.

So right after the ceasefire was announced, you had a wave of repression in Gaza.

There is still some talk of using these militias to police, if you like, Gaza.

There was actually an interesting piece in the Wall Street Journal, you may have seen, Mike, about a week or two ago, by Osama al-Assad, who is the leader of something called the Counterterrorism Strike Force in Gaza.

And he was scathing.

about Hamas in that piece.

He actually even said, you know, I lost my daughter and my granddaughter, I believe it was, in an Israeli bombing, not because the nasty Zionists came and killed them, but because Hamas was using them as human shields.

So there's clearly a recognition among Gazans that Hamas has been using this strategy.

And what was argued in this particular opinion piece was, look, I have my militia, my counterterrorism strike force.

We can ally with other clans in Gaza.

We are an alternative to Hamas.

Now, that might seem like pie in the sky, but actually it may be one of the more viable options that we have if we're going to stick to our guns and say, right, there is no place for Hamas in any governing structure.

Again, I think that strategy is fraught with risks.

Again, Lebanon is a good parallel to explain why the Israelis had a surrogate force, the South Lebanon army, for much of the last two decades of the 20th century.

I think it was sort of dismantled.

in the early 2000s.