Colin Klein

speaker
462 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard Jan 2016 last heard Jan 2016

Colin Klein’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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Uh one of the ways you can defend intentionalism if you're so inclined is to say pains have a content, but let's distinguish the type of content and say, look, there's imperative content that does some of these and uh you know indicative content that does the rest.
Now there's this bigger question in the background with intentionalism of something like, well, why is it that having content at all is sufficient for uh you know, being aware at all?
Do you need something more to this?
Is it the type of content?
These are big questions and in some sense they are um they're questions that I intentionally dodge in the book because I uh it's not a book about consciousness.
Uh I think
If I had that story, I would be, you know, I would be making more money and be more famous than I am.
So I've been trying to focus in on this more specific question.
Um, well, what is it that, you know, distinguishes pain from other sensations?
What is it that distinguishes different types of pains from each other?
Uh and
You know, I think that's if you're if you're going at the book looking for a theory of consciousness generally or a sort of the thing that will convince you of intentionalism where you weren't convinced before
you're likely to be a bit disappointed.
But on the other hand, I think, if you want to defend something like intentionalism, the thing to do, as in fact many people do, is to go through and think more carefully and in a this sort of detailed way about what the contents are and what their structures are and so forth.
Uh and
how that can capture a lot of the variation within pain you know within and between pains.
Uh and so that's the sort of thing that I'm uh trying to do.
Whereas, you know, your thought there's some surely some further story about why your thought I should not uh play ultimate frisbee because I should protect my arm.
Well that has a sort of cognitive phenomenology rather than a sensory phenomenology and so on.
But that that starts getting to think
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