Colin Klein

speaker
462 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard Jan 2016 last heard Jan 2016

Colin Klein’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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There are two things to say there.
I mean just as a bit of background here.
So the the the let me give you the quick answer which may not be satisfying and then the background which may not make it any more satisfying will at least explain why I'm saying it.
The quick answer is the sort of ordinary language thought that you have when you when you think, oh gee, I should protect my arm by not playing Ultimate anymore.
Um
And uh just say tangentially, by the way, one of the things about uh
working on pantas.
I believe I've now heard more broken arm and broken leg stories than any other philosopher.
Uh but any case, one of the things you uh get out of this or it's sorry, the um the ordinary engl language English sentence in your head, I take it, is gonna have
Very roughly similar content, but in fact the content of your pain is gonna be quite specific, um and quite complex.
And of course, you know, that's why there's a phenomenological difference.
So in the background here, at least the way I set it up in the book, uh I'm tempted by the philosophical position known as intentionalism, which says something like in the weak form, phenomenal properties supervene on intentional properties or supervene on the contents, uh intentional contents.
The the reason why that's attractive is if you've got naturalist leanings and you think that content can then be further reduced, uh uh can be part of some naturalist reduction, uh then you've got a story about how you move from phenomenology down to something naturalistically respectable.
Uh
I would like that to be true.
That's as far as I can tell the easiest way to do it if it works.
Pains are one of those sort of traditional uh
um traditional objections to intentionalism.
Uh for some of the reasons I mentioned before, it seems like they have very different qualities.
Uh and so the my original work on this was to say, look
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