David Shor

People who wrote books like Why We're Polarized, for instance. Yeah, exactly. Just to see everything through this transformation. But I think the most important trend politically of the last 30 to 40 years, both here and in every other country in the world, at least Western country that has elections, has been the story of education polarization.

People who wrote books like Why We're Polarized, for instance. Yeah, exactly. Just to see everything through this transformation. But I think the most important trend politically of the last 30 to 40 years, both here and in every other country in the world, at least Western country that has elections, has been the story of education polarization.

Everywhere we've seen highly educated people move to the left and, you know, working class people move to the right. I think a lot of people's analytical error when looking at Trump is that they saw Trump as this kind of reincarnation of, you know, the 1960s of like George Wallace or something, when really I think he was representing this global trend.

Everywhere we've seen highly educated people move to the left and, you know, working class people move to the right. I think a lot of people's analytical error when looking at Trump is that they saw Trump as this kind of reincarnation of, you know, the 1960s of like George Wallace or something, when really I think he was representing this global trend.

That's exactly right. And I would just say, I think this shouldn't be that surprising. I think now, you know, we identify the Democratic Party as straightforwardly liberal. You know, the Democratic Party used to be a coalition between liberals and moderates and conservatives.

That's exactly right. And I would just say, I think this shouldn't be that surprising. I think now, you know, we identify the Democratic Party as straightforwardly liberal. You know, the Democratic Party used to be a coalition between liberals and moderates and conservatives.

And as liberals kind of became the dominant coalition partner, it makes sense, you know, that the conservatives and moderates in our coalition who were disproportionately nonwhite, given that this ideological polarization happened, you know, among whites 20 years ago or 30 years ago, that you would start to see this.

And as liberals kind of became the dominant coalition partner, it makes sense, you know, that the conservatives and moderates in our coalition who were disproportionately nonwhite, given that this ideological polarization happened, you know, among whites 20 years ago or 30 years ago, that you would start to see this.

And what you can see here is just that in 2020, in their data, people who didn't vote, if they had voted, would have been a little bit more Democratic than the country overall. But over the next four years, people who didn't vote went from being a somewhat Democratic-leaning group to a group that Trump won by double digits.

And what you can see here is just that in 2020, in their data, people who didn't vote, if they had voted, would have been a little bit more Democratic than the country overall. But over the next four years, people who didn't vote went from being a somewhat Democratic-leaning group to a group that Trump won by double digits.

So the second graph here, we have, you know, for every precinct, we look at what percentage of people voted in 2022. And then we just look at what was the change in Democratic vote share from 2020 to 2024. And so what you could see here is that for the lowest turnout precincts, you know, Trump increased his vote share by, you know, something like 6%.

So the second graph here, we have, you know, for every precinct, we look at what percentage of people voted in 2022. And then we just look at what was the change in Democratic vote share from 2020 to 2024. And so what you could see here is that for the lowest turnout precincts, you know, Trump increased his vote share by, you know, something like 6%.

While for the highest turnout precincts, Harris actually increased her support. And, you know, that's really the story of this election is that, you know, people who follow news really closely, who get their news from traditional media, who like say that politics is an important part of their identity, they became more democratic in absolute terms.

While for the highest turnout precincts, Harris actually increased her support. And, you know, that's really the story of this election is that, you know, people who follow news really closely, who get their news from traditional media, who like say that politics is an important part of their identity, they became more democratic in absolute terms.

But for people who don't follow politics closely at all, they just became a lot more Republican.

But for people who don't follow politics closely at all, they just became a lot more Republican.

Yeah, and I mean, that's 100% right. And I just want to stress that this is a new problem. This problem didn't exist four years ago. And it's not just that New York Times readers are more liberal than the overall population. That's definitely true. It's that they're more liberal than they were four years ago, even though the country went the other way.

Yeah, and I mean, that's 100% right. And I just want to stress that this is a new problem. This problem didn't exist four years ago. And it's not just that New York Times readers are more liberal than the overall population. That's definitely true. It's that they're more liberal than they were four years ago, even though the country went the other way.

And so there's this great political divergence between people who consume all the news sources that we know about and read about versus the people who don't.

And so there's this great political divergence between people who consume all the news sources that we know about and read about versus the people who don't.