Emily Adlam

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1,263 appearances 3 recordings 1 series first heard Apr 2025 last heard 20 Jul

Emily Adlam’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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Recordings per month over the last 12 months — 1 in all, peaking in Jul 2026 with 1.

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Theories of Everything with Curt Jaimungal · Emily Adlam: Reality Is a Completed Puzzle, Not a Flowing River · 11 Apr 2025 podcast

Uh so in particular the cosmological multiverse and the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics as a multiverse.

And in both of these multiverses, in order to make certain kinds of predictions, uh, it's necessary that you uh assign some credences uh

Over uh locations within the multiverse.

You have to assign probabilities to which universe you might be within this this this multiverse.

And so all of those uh all of those approaches to uh making predictions in a multiverse are kind of predicated on the assumption that there is, in fact, some some objectively right or uniquely correct way to assign your self-locating credences over parts of the multiverse.

Uh and so uh there therefore

they they are necessarily predicated on the claim that there are unique ways to assign pure self-locating credences.

There's a right way to do it and there's a wrong way to do it.

So I think that's wrong.

I think that for superficially self-locating credences, there are right ways to assign them because those right those credences can just be inherited from a scientific theory.

But in the pure case, there is nothing whatsoever which could compel you or constrain you to assign your credences in any particular

Yeah.

So any assignation of credences is fine, and therefore you're not going to be able to get meaningful predictions out of any theory which involves this kind of multiverse reasoning.

So if if I'm right about that, that's a serious problem, both for the cosmological multiverse and for the the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, because it seems to say that we can't make m meaningful predictions in that context, and we therefore can't uh obtain any sensible evidence for scientific theories in that context.

Because there's nothing to sort of predict and then see if it comes true.

Uh I have not spoken to Sean Carroll about this.

I uh I know that Carroll has um

Has uh

a a view of the multiverse which uh i i and of the Everitian multiverse in particular, which is based on the idea that, you know, certain constraints on self-locating credences um

Uh certain constraints on subvocating credences uh can help tell you how to uh assign uh probabilities in the Everesian case.

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