Fareed Zakaria

The entire digital economy is totally dominated by the U.S. Why is that? Because we allowed ourselves to transition to where the frontiers of the economy were. This whole idea of trying to hold on to the 19th century or the 1920s It doesn't work. It's incredibly expensive. Nobody has been able to do it.

The entire digital economy is totally dominated by the U.S. Why is that? Because we allowed ourselves to transition to where the frontiers of the economy were. This whole idea of trying to hold on to the 19th century or the 1920s It doesn't work. It's incredibly expensive. Nobody has been able to do it.

Manufacturing employment today, after Donald Trump's four years and Joe Biden's four years, is the same as it was roughly 10, 15 years ago. So I think that this whole obsession is fundamentally misconceived. What we should do is much more redistribution so that the people who lose out in these periods of technological change are taken care of. But the idea that we can go back to 1950 is just nuts.

Manufacturing employment today, after Donald Trump's four years and Joe Biden's four years, is the same as it was roughly 10, 15 years ago. So I think that this whole obsession is fundamentally misconceived. What we should do is much more redistribution so that the people who lose out in these periods of technological change are taken care of. But the idea that we can go back to 1950 is just nuts.

I would guess that America first for Trump and for many of his followers. And again, I wouldn't put some of the ideologists of MAGA in the same category. But I think for Trump, it's the idea that the United States has been constrained for too long

I would guess that America first for Trump and for many of his followers. And again, I wouldn't put some of the ideologists of MAGA in the same category. But I think for Trump, it's the idea that the United States has been constrained for too long

by globalism, by worrying about the international environment, by worrying about all these alliances constrained by these international organizations, that, again, we've been the sucker, that what America first means is we're going to break through all that bullshit and we're just going to do what's good for America.

by globalism, by worrying about the international environment, by worrying about all these alliances constrained by these international organizations, that, again, we've been the sucker, that what America first means is we're going to break through all that bullshit and we're just going to do what's good for America.

But what is left undefined, as you're saying, is, well, what is good for America? Why would it be good for America to break apart the international trading system? Why would it be good for America to break apart this world it's created? So that part, I think, is undefined. But you can see the impulse and what the attraction is to a lot of people.

But what is left undefined, as you're saying, is, well, what is good for America? Why would it be good for America to break apart the international trading system? Why would it be good for America to break apart this world it's created? So that part, I think, is undefined. But you can see the impulse and what the attraction is to a lot of people.

A lot of people who have always felt that the United States, by the way, run by this elite cabal of urban liberals, overeducated urban liberals in places like New York and Washington, has been selling America out. This was basically, if you think of the 1950s, this was the McCarthy attack in many ways. So I think in some ways it's a hearkening back to that idea.

A lot of people who have always felt that the United States, by the way, run by this elite cabal of urban liberals, overeducated urban liberals in places like New York and Washington, has been selling America out. This was basically, if you think of the 1950s, this was the McCarthy attack in many ways. So I think in some ways it's a hearkening back to that idea.

Yeah, I think you have it exactly right. And in a way, he has a kind of fascination, not just with America, I think, in the 19th century in the way exactly the way you described, but also in kind of geopolitics of the 19th century to the extent that I think he understands it, which is, you know, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, to quote Thucydides. And that idea that

Yeah, I think you have it exactly right. And in a way, he has a kind of fascination, not just with America, I think, in the 19th century in the way exactly the way you described, but also in kind of geopolitics of the 19th century to the extent that I think he understands it, which is, you know, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, to quote Thucydides. And that idea that

We are powerful. We should be unconstrained. It's very familiar in a sense. That's what the Chinese foreign minister said at a meeting of ASEAN nations where he was telling, I think it was the Philippines or the Singaporeans, you know, you've got to understand we are big and powerful. You are not dangerous. We're going to tell you what to do. Obviously, it is the way Putin views the world.

We are powerful. We should be unconstrained. It's very familiar in a sense. That's what the Chinese foreign minister said at a meeting of ASEAN nations where he was telling, I think it was the Philippines or the Singaporeans, you know, you've got to understand we are big and powerful. You are not dangerous. We're going to tell you what to do. Obviously, it is the way Putin views the world.

That's why I think he has a much more benign view of Putin's desire to have a sphere of influence, a kind of a group of satellite states around him, including Ukraine. He has a much more benign view, I think, of Chinese expansionism. He very rarely criticizes it. I can't remember him ever doing it.

That's why I think he has a much more benign view of Putin's desire to have a sphere of influence, a kind of a group of satellite states around him, including Ukraine. He has a much more benign view, I think, of Chinese expansionism. He very rarely criticizes it. I can't remember him ever doing it.

And so then he looks at it and says, well, the United States should similarly have that kind of sense of the Monroe Doctrine, the Western Hemisphere. Again, to me, it misses the sort of central point about the transformation of the international system after World War II, which is that you realized you don't need territory to become rich and powerful and incredibly effective in the world.

And so then he looks at it and says, well, the United States should similarly have that kind of sense of the Monroe Doctrine, the Western Hemisphere. Again, to me, it misses the sort of central point about the transformation of the international system after World War II, which is that you realized you don't need territory to become rich and powerful and incredibly effective in the world.