Fareed Zakaria

That is, you know, seismic for what was really America's most important ally in Europe to say that our principal strategic task now is to find a strategy of independence away from the United States. And you're going to see other countries do variations of that. And in some cases, Those countries will be probably doing private kind of hedging in a way that they can't publicly admit to.

That is, you know, seismic for what was really America's most important ally in Europe to say that our principal strategic task now is to find a strategy of independence away from the United States. And you're going to see other countries do variations of that. And in some cases, Those countries will be probably doing private kind of hedging in a way that they can't publicly admit to.

The one part I don't agree with you is I think there are countries that are going to do deals with America. Everyone is going to be wary of a long-term relationship. Because they realize that certainly in this new world, those don't mean that much.

The one part I don't agree with you is I think there are countries that are going to do deals with America. Everyone is going to be wary of a long-term relationship. Because they realize that certainly in this new world, those don't mean that much.

I was in Australia last December, and I met with a senior official there who said to me, you know, we're very happy to be in this closer relationship with the United States. We're delighted that you're sharing your nuclear technology with us, you know, the nuclear subs deal that we made with them.

I was in Australia last December, and I met with a senior official there who said to me, you know, we're very happy to be in this closer relationship with the United States. We're delighted that you're sharing your nuclear technology with us, you know, the nuclear subs deal that we made with them.

But the big question we wonder about is we have now put ourselves in a structurally confrontational role vis-a-vis our principal trading partner, China. We didn't have to do that. China is a long way away. We were happily trading with them. We hope to continue to do that. But it has completely changed the relationship we have with China. That's okay if you have our back.

But the big question we wonder about is we have now put ourselves in a structurally confrontational role vis-a-vis our principal trading partner, China. We didn't have to do that. China is a long way away. We were happily trading with them. We hope to continue to do that. But it has completely changed the relationship we have with China. That's okay if you have our back.

But if in a few years you decide to cut a deal with China, we will have made a generational strategic error. And I think that is what's going to be in every country's mind, you know, about getting close to the United States in a long term. That's why I say these alliances took eight decades to build.

But if in a few years you decide to cut a deal with China, we will have made a generational strategic error. And I think that is what's going to be in every country's mind, you know, about getting close to the United States in a long term. That's why I say these alliances took eight decades to build.

I broadly agree with what you're saying. That Europe needed a kind of a kick in the pants. And interestingly, the threat from Russia has turned out not to be big enough to get Europe kind of energized.

I broadly agree with what you're saying. That Europe needed a kind of a kick in the pants. And interestingly, the threat from Russia has turned out not to be big enough to get Europe kind of energized.

And the threat of the abandonment of the United States is actually more significant than the threat of Russian aggression. And so they will probably spend more. They will coordinate more on defense. Maybe they'll even do more. I think that the fundamental issue with productivity in Europe is much larger than the U.S. or Russia.

And the threat of the abandonment of the United States is actually more significant than the threat of Russian aggression. And so they will probably spend more. They will coordinate more on defense. Maybe they'll even do more. I think that the fundamental issue with productivity in Europe is much larger than the U.S. or Russia.

Seeing where the total factor productivity rises in Europe over the next five years is maybe unrelated, but I do think they will coordinate more in defense. They'll coordinate more in foreign policy. They'll spend more. What you will lose is they will be less deferential to the United States.

Seeing where the total factor productivity rises in Europe over the next five years is maybe unrelated, but I do think they will coordinate more in defense. They'll coordinate more in foreign policy. They'll spend more. What you will lose is they will be less deferential to the United States.

Right. I was about to say, we had a system where We kind of ran the world. We ran the world because the European Union essentially did exactly what we wanted them to and was a satellite of the United States. So we would be experimenting with a different system. Yeah, the Europeans will spend more. You know, it is worth pointing out it's

Right. I was about to say, we had a system where We kind of ran the world. We ran the world because the European Union essentially did exactly what we wanted them to and was a satellite of the United States. So we would be experimenting with a different system. Yeah, the Europeans will spend more. You know, it is worth pointing out it's

There was a reason we wanted to denationalize the foreign and defense policies of countries like Germany. And Germany in particular, trapped in the center of Europe, has always had a difficult time having a kind of sensible, moderate foreign policy. So there were great virtues to saying to the Germans, you know what, guys, don't worry so much about your security. We'll take care of it.

There was a reason we wanted to denationalize the foreign and defense policies of countries like Germany. And Germany in particular, trapped in the center of Europe, has always had a difficult time having a kind of sensible, moderate foreign policy. So there were great virtues to saying to the Germans, you know what, guys, don't worry so much about your security. We'll take care of it.