Jordan Schneider

You have Trump talking about re-industrialization.

And a lot of people, I think, over the past few years have made the argument, oh, like America cutting off chips to China, that's only going to make them like industrialize, you know, build chips faster.

Like, well, we're about to run that experiment in the opposite direction.

Because I think the rare earth stuff has gotten a lot of people very focused and concerned in the West.

And then we're going to have this very fascinating sort of like system competition where like, is the fact that America still like, I guess, kind of a little bit has friends around the world who are also worried about Chinese rare earth export controls.

Like, will that cut against the advantages that the Chinese system has of being able to keep their eye on the ball for a longer period of time and being able to sort of boss companies and countries around?

Like, that's a whole different ballgame.

Well, rerunning the tape of the 20s and 30s, that would be a real phase change, right?

I mean, I think it's somewhere in between, right?

Because I agree with the thesis.

So during the Cold War, you did not have these dynamics between the U.S.

and any kind of non-Warsaw Pact country.

Right.

You know, and then we had this really nice, you know, 25 years from 1990 to, you know, 2013, 2014 or so, where, like, as long as you weren't Iran or North Korea, you kind of got to play the same game.

Everyone was kind of on the same side.

And the benefits to the Ricardian version of international commerce.

any sort of latent concerns that weird history nerds had about the return to a world where you had great powers kind of competing much more directly than they did in the past.

Look like we now have policy that's basically driven by three people.

And that is new.

I'm trying to work out which three you're talking about.