Nic Koziolek

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326 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard May 2017 last heard May 2017

Nic Koziolek’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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Elucidations · Episode 96: Nic Koziolek discusses the role of belief in reasoning · 8 May 2017 podcast

I mean I noticed the cans of water when I was looking for an example of actually this very thing that we're talking about now.

And I thought, well what would make a good example?

Well there are three different flavors of water on that shelf.

Let's go with that.

But until then I had not, you know, paid any attention to those cans.

Okay, so we can actually use a slight variation of an another example of good reasoning that I'm that I mentioned earlier.

You might, in this case, believe that Socrates is wise, and believe that all philosophers are wise, and believe

come to believe thereby that Socrates is a philosopher.

And now, although you might have missed it when you say it out loud because these things are sort of confusing, that actually is a bad inference.

It's an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

And so what's bad about this inference is that what you believe is that Socrates is wise.

And you're trying to use the additional piece of information that all philosophers are wise to draw the conclusion that Socrates is a philosopher.

The problem is that if there are people who are wise that aren't philosophers, and this is compatible with the view that all philosophers are wise, it might be that every philosopher is wise, but also some doctors are wise, and Socrates is one of the wise doctors.

then it's not going to follow that Socrates is a philosopher.

So this isn't a good inference.

And now there's a problem about how to explain the possibility of these sorts of bad inferences and how to connect them to good inferences.

In the case of a fallacious inference, it looks like what happens is, you know, we want to say

Just as we want to say in the case of good reasoning, that

your what I'll call the premise judgments cause the conclusion judgment.

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