Nic Koziolek

speaker
326 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard May 2017 last heard May 2017

Nic Koziolek’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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You also mistakenly come to believe that your premise judgment has caused your conclusion judgment in such a way as to allow you to know it.
So what happens
When you perform a fallacious inference,
is that you mistakenly think that you've come to know the conclusion on the basis of your knowledge of the premises
When in fact you haven't come to know it.
At least in part because you can't come to know that conclusion on the basis of those premises, because the premises don't support the conclusion.
Yes, exactly.
Although maybe not falsely.
It might in fact be true.
You just can't come to know it on that basis.
Oh, I see, right.
So it might accidentally be true relative to the reasons you believe it.
So on my view, b belief and knowledge are actually um in a certain sense mental states of the same kind.
And in particular I take the sort of very traditional view in philosophy that knowledge is a kind of belief.
And so one way of putting this is to say that knowledge is an especially good way of believing.
Um knowledge is belief where everything has gone well.
And the opposite way of putting this is to say that what we might call mere belief, belief that's not knowledge, is just an attempt at knowledge that has gone badly.
And so they're very similar in a lot of respects, but they're different in sort of how successful they are in connecting you to the facts, as we might put it.
So this is where my view starts to come together as a whole a little bit.
I wanna step up a level and say, you know, about thought in general, that is what we can call theoretical thought, um thought about the world.
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