Rob

Yeah.

What do you think are the most likely accidental escalation scenarios?

Why don't you think of the risk of Russia deliberately attacking a NATO country as being that likely?

I mean, I guess the scenario I've always been most worried about, I guess, is Russia attacking one of the Baltic states, trying to engage in a fait accompli there.

And then I guess that could just quite clearly escalate to a full war.

Right.

Something that surprised me.

So in the article, you're saying it's plausible that it could be an even more dangerous period after we have a ceasefire in Ukraine.

That makes me wonder...

Do we actually desperately want to bend over backwards to achieve a ceasefire if we think that, in fact, that is only going to be the beginning of another stage of set of provocations or of risks that are created?

Maybe in a sense, I mean, it's horrific for Ukraine, but in a sense, you have Russia bogged down in this quagmire in Ukraine.

They don't have attention or resources to focus on anyone else to be hassling other countries.

So maybe that's actually quite a convenient place to leave them stuck.

So back when we spoke in 2022, you thought that the war was, as I understand, was primarily motivated by Russia's security fears, as you know, NATO encroachment and encirclement, as opposed to kind of a genuine ideological belief that Ukraine is and always has been Russian and that Ukrainian nationality is basically fake.

I guess since then, we've seen...

we've got like many years of track record of Russian behavior, including like forced Russification, child deportation on a very big scale.

Does the identity or nationalist motivation now seem kind of any more central to you than it did back then?

Right, right, right.

Do you think, in a sense, Russia's security position seems worse now, right?

NATO, in many ways, is more up in their business.