#240 – Samuel Charap on how a Ukraine ceasefire could accidentally set Europe up for a bigger war
episodePreviously titled “A Ukraine ceasefire could accidentally set Europe up for a bigger war | RAND's top Russia expert Samuel Charap” — renamed by the publisher on Aug 4, 2026
Transcript
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What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
Russia is at war, full-scale conventional war involving a whole range of high-end weapon systems, including long-range strike, in a country that borders four NATO allies.
Could a ceasefire in Ukraine lead to greater risks for Europe?
The idea that Russia would be completely deterred by the presence of a small number of UK and French forces inside Ukraine, I think, is low probability. I think it is higher probability that the promise of such a presence will deter Russia from accepting a ceasefire. If Moscow were to see itself as losing Belarus, it would not hesitate to act. There are lots of risks attendant with this war that we've become accustomed to, but every once in a while, you know, we see an incident and we're reminded that at any moment, this could spiral out of control.
Samuel Cherub is the distinguished chair in Russia and Eurasia policy at the Iran Corporation and one of the most influential voices in the US policy debate on how the war in Ukraine should end. He's argued for a negotiated settlement since early in the war, sticking with that position even when it has been highly unfashionable in DC and attracted heated criticism. He's been specializing in Russia-Ukraine relations for decades, speaks both Russian and Ukrainian, and in 2017 wrote, Everyone Loses, The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. If anything, I would say an understatement in hindsight. Welcome back to the show, Samuel. Thanks for having me, Rob.
What are Russia's motivations for the ongoing conflict?
Your most recent piece, Europe's Next War, the Rising Risk of a NATO-Russia Conflict, argues that the risk of a direct NATO-Russia confrontation could actually be higher after a ceasefire in Ukraine, which I think to many people will seem kind of counterintuitive. It's somewhat counterintuitive to me. So let's start with a big picture question. I guess, how seriously should we take the risk, the probability of a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia?
Well, I think in looking at the security environment after the war, so after the hot phase of fighting between Russia and Ukraine is over, we can see a lot of the trends that have emerged during the war that is the remilitarization of Europe, the further militarization of Russia, a deep sense of sort of resentment and in fact, even stronger feelings towards the West after so many Russians have died as Russians see it at the hands of a Western proxy.
What constitutes a viable ceasefire agreement in Ukraine?
The fears that are quite pervasive in Europe about Russian aggression and the lack of communication and the sort of breakdown in the entire infrastructure of interaction that used to exist both on a societal and on a state-to-state level between Russia and NATO and its member states. So it's an environment that's ripe for the kind of miscalculation, misunderstanding, miscommunication that can lead to conflict. You know, what we're saying in the piece is essentially that there's got to be some thinking put in now to how to stabilize the post-war environment and avoid, you know, the worst case outcome. We caution against maybe focusing too much on the opportunistic aggression scenarios, which you hear a lot about, like Russia up and deciding that it, you know, say, wants to take Lithuania or...
accomplish a sort of fait accompli in a Russian-speaking area in Estonia, say, rather than more sort of breakdown in the security environment that causes, you know, one thing leads to another and you end up in a war, not necessarily because one side had initial aggressive intent or intended for that outcome to occur.
Yeah. What do you think are the most likely accidental escalation scenarios?
Well, I mean, we could easily imagine, for example, the ceasefire in Ukraine when there is one, and I'm sure there eventually will be one, breaking down because often ceasefires do break down. And when that kind of thing happens, I think a future Russia-Ukraine war could drag in European neighbors and not only European neighbors. much more so than now when there's sort of unwritten rules of the game that direct involvement is off the table. But I think a lot of European leaders have basically said, if this were to happen again, we're going to be much more deeply involved.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
0:00–0:10
2
Could a ceasefire in Ukraine lead to greater risks for Europe?
0:10–1:19
3
What are Russia's motivations for the ongoing conflict?
1:19–2:20
4
What constitutes a viable ceasefire agreement in Ukraine?
2:20–4:58
5
What challenges are currently preventing a ceasefire?
4:58–5:46
6
Why might Russia accept Ukraine's EU membership?
5:46–6:01
7
How can NATO prevent escalation of conflict with Russia?
6:01–6:08
8
What does the future hold for nuclear arms control?
6:08–1:12:05
Speakers
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