Samuel Charap
speaker
472 appearances
1 recordings
1 series
first heard Mar 2026
last heard 24 Mar
Samuel Charap’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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recordings per month · last 12 monthsRecordings per month over the last 12 months — 1 in all, peaking in Mar 2026 with 1.
Appearances
Russia is at war, full-scale conventional war involving a whole range of high-end weapon systems, including long-range strike, in a country that borders four NATO allies.
The idea that Russia would be completely deterred by the presence of a small number of UK and French forces inside Ukraine, I think, is low probability.
I think it is higher probability that the promise of such a presence
will deter Russia from accepting a ceasefire.
If Moscow were to see itself as losing Belarus, it would not hesitate to act.
There are lots of risks attendant with this war that we've become accustomed to, but every once in a while, you know, we see an incident and we're reminded that at any moment, this could spiral out of control.
Well, I think in looking at the security environment after the war, so after the hot phase of fighting between Russia and Ukraine is over, we can see a lot of the trends that have emerged during the war that is
the remilitarization of Europe, the further militarization of Russia, a deep sense of sort of resentment and in fact, even stronger feelings towards the West after so many Russians have died as Russians see it at the hands of a Western proxy.
The fears that are quite pervasive in Europe about Russian aggression
and the lack of communication and the sort of breakdown in the entire infrastructure of interaction that used to exist both on a societal and on a state-to-state level between Russia and NATO and its member states.
So it's an environment that's ripe for the kind of miscalculation, misunderstanding, miscommunication that can lead to conflict.
You know, what we're saying in the piece is essentially that there's got to be some thinking put in now to how to stabilize the post-war environment and avoid, you know, the worst case outcome.
We caution against maybe focusing too much on the opportunistic aggression scenarios, which you hear a lot about, like Russia up and deciding that it, you know, say, wants to take Lithuania or...
accomplish a sort of fait accompli in a Russian-speaking area in Estonia, say, rather than more sort of breakdown in the security environment that causes, you know, one thing leads to another and you end up in a war, not necessarily because one side had initial aggressive intent or intended for that outcome to occur.
Well, I mean, we could easily imagine, for example, the ceasefire in Ukraine when there is one, and I'm sure there eventually will be one, breaking down because often ceasefires do break down.
And when that kind of thing happens, I think a future Russia-Ukraine war could drag in European neighbors and not only European neighbors.
much more so than now when there's sort of unwritten rules of the game that direct involvement is off the table.
But I think a lot of European leaders have basically said, if this were to happen again, we're going to be much more deeply involved.
So that's one scenario.
Another is, for example, instability in Belarus.
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