Sam Winter-Levy
speaker
361 appearances
1 recordings
1 series
first heard Mar 2026
last heard 10 Mar
Sam Winter-Levy’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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recordings per month · last 12 monthsRecordings per month over the last 12 months — 1 in all, peaking in Mar 2026 with 1.
Appearances
But given the stakes in the nuclear domain, given this is likely, you know, a top, top priority of any major nuclear arm state, things would have to go wrong for them not to be paying significant attention to this problem set, especially given that in many of these domains where we've been, you know,
They don't necessarily need to be at the technological frontier to shore up the survivability of their second strike forces.
And the onus is entirely on the attacker to be able to get close to 100% certainty to pull off this kind of remarkably difficult sensor fusion challenge where you're trying to target submarines and mobile launchers and hardened silos all at once with no room for error and no margin for testing.
So...
Yeah, a lot of this does depend on states acting.
It does depend on equilibrium behavior shaking out.
And there is the possibility that windows could emerge.
But the balance is tilted against the state that might want to launch a splendid first strike.
Yes, I think, you know, when we describe these move-counter-move dynamics, I think that gives us a degree of confidence that...
nuclear deterrence in the sense of a secure second-strike capability will survive.
But, as you say, there are big costs associated with these dynamics that will play out in response to technological change or in response to fears of technological change, because exactly this move-countermove scenario is essentially a form of nuclear arms racing, as states feel more insecure about their second-strike capabilities as they disperse launches, build up more warheads, build more decoys,
trying to take moves to shore up their second strike capabilities.
That's very expensive, not just in terms of just the sheer economic costs, but also in the political costs in terms of the kind of mutual hostility and distrust that will play out in this kind of security dilemma type story.
Exactly, the Cold War wasn't a good time.
So even if second-strike capabilities survive as a result of this kind of move-counter-move scenario, that's still a very kind of destabilizing, potentially kind of scary world to live in.
So we definitely don't want to seem sanguine about the impact of AI on nuclear stability, even if truly undermining the state's second-strike capabilities is a hard lift for states to pull off.
And it also just increases the risk of accidents.
So if you're having your mobile launchers drive faster to make them harder to target, that's just a kind of more accident-prone type of move to take.
If you're reducing their ability to... If you're reducing signals communications because you're worried about a state intercepting them, or if you are...
delegating the launch authority to lower levels because you're worried about a state interfering with your nuclear command and control systems.
Showing 241–260 of 361 · page 13 of 19
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