#238 – Sam Winter-Levy and Nikita Lalwani on how AGI won't end mutually assured destruction (probably)
episodePreviously titled “AI Won't End Mutually Assured Destruction (Probably) | Sam Winter-Levy & Nikita Lalwani” — renamed by the publisher on Aug 4, 2026
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What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
There's a lot of uncertainty with this fast takeoff scenario.
Who are the guests and what are their backgrounds?
If it does happen, that could really change the calculus on the nuclear deterrence question.
How does nuclear deterrence function in international relations?
In a nuclear world, once you have nuclear weapons, the winner of contests and these kind of bargaining dynamics is determined less by the balance of power, like which side has more weapons, a stronger economy, more resources, and more by the balance of nerves.
Can AI effectively locate nuclear submarines in the ocean?
Which side is more resolved?
What challenges do road-mobile missiles face in detection?
Which side is more willing to run a higher risk of nuclear escalation?
How might AI improve missile defense systems?
Which side cares more about a particular outcome?
What is the significance of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)?
Imagine sort of going to the president today and saying, you know, this AI system can tell us with 100% certainty where all of China's nuclear weapons are.
Could AI lead to a new arms race despite maintaining deterrence?
Would he accept that statement unquestioningly? Or would he have some doubt as to whether the system was foolproof?
I think the AI community AI experts are really best placed to understand the technologies that are emerging, but they are not expert on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. And conversely, you know, the nuclear community knows that field of work, but it's just not necessarily entirely on top of the frontier of AI breakthroughs.
Today, I'm speaking with Nikita Lalwani and Sam Winter-Levy. Nikita is a lawyer and policymaker. Previously, she served as director for technology and national security at the White House, where she focused on issues related to U.S.-China technology competition. And before that, as a senior advisor to the director of the CHIPS program office at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Sam is a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on the intersection of national security and AI. They've both just co-authored a really great piece for foreign affairs called The End of Mutual Assured Destruction, What AI Will Mean for Nuclear Deterrence. Thanks for coming on the podcast, Nikita and Sam.
Thanks so much for having us.
Great to be here.
You think AI experts need to pay more attention to nuclear deterrence. What is the case for that?
Yeah, so the basic case here is that nuclear deterrence is a key check on the ability of even technologically very powerful states to impose their political preferences on their less technologically advanced adversaries. And so long as nuclear deterrence remains in place, we think the economic and military advantages produced by AI while very significant, will not necessarily allow states to kind of completely dominate one another. States will continue to temper their actions for fear of nuclear reprisal. And there will remain pretty significant limits on states' ability to impose their political preferences on their kind of major nuclear-armed adversaries. But conversely, if AI does undermine nuclear deterrence, then the technology really could make a state unrivaled in its capabilities to threaten, coerce, and dominate its adversaries.
So we think this kind of question, whether nuclear deterrence persists or erodes in this age of AI that we're entering, will fundamentally shape both the risks and the stakes of the AI competition.
Yeah, it seems like a really big deal which way this question goes. I think there are a bunch of kind of nitty gritty details to get into to really understand the role of nuclear weapons in a world where one country or maybe multiple countries are building AGI. But to understand those, I want to quickly run through some key concepts. So nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction. I guess first, can you give just a very quick refresher on what exactly nuclear deterrence is and how it works?
Yeah, absolutely. So very quickly, deterrence refers to the practice of dissuading an adversary from taking certain undesirable actions up to and including a nuclear attack. And the way deterrence works is by making your adversary think it should not act either because its objectives are too costly or too uncertain or because the penalties it will incur from acting outweigh any benefits. The concept of deterrence has been at the heart of international relations theory and international politics for much of the last century.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
0:00–0:03
2
Who are the guests and what are their backgrounds?
0:03–0:07
3
How does nuclear deterrence function in international relations?
0:07–0:22
4
Can AI effectively locate nuclear submarines in the ocean?
0:22–0:23
5
What challenges do road-mobile missiles face in detection?
0:23–0:26
6
How might AI improve missile defense systems?
0:26–0:28
7
What is the significance of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)?
0:28–0:36
8
Could AI lead to a new arms race despite maintaining deterrence?
0:36–1:11:02
Speakers
3 identifiedMore from 80,000 Hours Podcast
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