Samuel Charap

speaker

472 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard Mar 2026 last heard 24 Mar

Samuel Charap’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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Recordings per month over the last 12 months — 1 in all, peaking in Mar 2026 with 1.

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80,000 Hours Podcast · #240 – Samuel Charap on how a Ukraine ceasefire could accidentally set Europe up for a bigger war · 24 Mar 2026 podcast

So I think I end up with a somewhat more nuanced view that it's not a matter of just sort of recognizing Russia's interests and therefore retreating, but taking into account the reality that Russian influence is not gonna go away.

We can try to counter it, but acting like there's no consequences for any Western policies, I think it would also be equally foolish.

I would also say, Hugh, in his interview with you, made the case that the lack of Western and particularly US military response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine is somehow demonstrative of a broader lack of US commitment to NATO.

And I would just disagree with that.

I think the distinction between NATO and non-NATO Europe

Particularly under the Biden administration, but even going forward under Trump, where we have just heard the undersecretary of war, I suppose now, make the case for returning NATO to its sort of factory settings.

In other words, focusing on territorial defense and deterrence.

I don't think that the U.S.

is going to cede the alliance commitments it's made in Europe, and I don't think it should.

So I think each of these regions, and I obviously know Asia a lot worse than I know the European theater in this context, but I think there are lots of nuances here that make broad brush arguments about how the implications of multipolarity are that we should just accept

spheres of influence a little bit too black and white.

I mean, I am convinced that Article 5 is an effective deterrent, that Russia believes in it and believes that it would be at war with the United States if it were to attack a NATO ally.

And I think Russia sees that war as one that it could not win conventionally and that would have, therefore, the potential for nuclear escalation.

This is not a scenario that Russia sees as beneficial, nor do I think it sees a particular –

Urgent reason to do it.

So ultimately, extended deterrence, which essentially means that the U.S.

is not only deterring an attack on itself, but it is extending that deterrent commitment to its allies in Europe and in Asia.

rests on something of a bluff or something of a commitment that we don't know what will happen if called, an uncertainty.

And that risk that leaves something to chance is precisely the kind of fear that deterrence is meant to create.

After all, deterrence comes from the word fear.

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