Ep. 396: Peirce on Knowledge (Part One)
episode
The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast
49 min
4 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 15 hours ago
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Can knowledge be based on intuition according to Peirce?
You're listening to the Partially Examined Life, a podcast by some guys who are at one point set on doing philosophy for a living, but then thought better of it. Our question for episode 396 is something like, Can we base knowledge on intuitions? And we read three papers by Charles Sanders Peirce. Questions concerning certain faculties, some consequences of the four incapacities, and on a new list of categories, all published in eighteen sixty seven and eighteen sixty eight. For more information about the text and the podcast, please see partiallyexamine life.com. This is Mark Lintonmeyer in Madison, Wisconsin, only sure of my own existence because
Because of my many errors. This is Seth Paskin unable to be prescinded from being, and yet being can be prescinded from me in Austin, Texas.
This is Wes Allwan, a mediating representation representing the relate standing for the correlate, with which the mediating representation is itself in relation in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
This is Dylan Casey assembled by many fibers in Madison, Wisconsin.
Alright, so I chose my opening for is with Mark's favorite phrase in the whole reading. Yes, I I pasted that in Slack in particular, saying this kind of verbiage makes me want to throw up. It took me a long time to understand what he was talking. I mean, you know, quote unquote understand. What he was talking about with that, at least, you know, nominally understand.
I feel like the ideas were n not so difficult, but his verbiage is unnecessarily complex.
We've never seen
that before. No. It's highly unusual for
philosophers. So our last visit to this fellow was back in 2010, and it was the second episode that Dylan ever appeared on, that he was still a guest with us. And we did the fixation of belief and how to make our ideas clear at that point. It was just in the context of pragmatism. And we didn't even spend the whole episode on purse. We just sort of made it a little preface to talk about James and to talk about pragmatism more generally. The stuff that we read this time. So yeah, Dylan, you I think looked this up on Claude or whatever. What was the these are sort of the foundational texts for approach.
It started with the fact that we were intending to do a Susan Hack. on evidence and inquiry. Yeah. And she points to purse a great deal, at least somewhat explicitly, but also as a intellectual forebearer. And so wanted to preface the conversation about her stuff with some of on purse. And so I went looking and uh used some help from Claude to pick some readings that were directly informing her work. And so that's where this group comes from. Now, Claude wouldn't be unique in picking out these particular group of texts, they sort of go together, as far as I can tell, generally, about his metaphysics and his epistemology.
So yeah, questions concerning certain faculties claimed for a man. I really enjoyed that one. It's sort of written like the Aquinas that we read, right? Here's a series of questions. And I didn't look if he was consistent about this, but I think at at least one case I think he's like, you know, sort of gives the it would seem like not, but actually, and then he's gonna argue just just like Aquinas did. He's certainly familiar with all that medieval stuff. So it's questions about intuitions, about self-consciousness. Do we have knowled is introspection even a thing? Can a sign be incognizable? Can we think without signs? Things like that. So good sort of psychology. And yeah, what a weird figure that he kind of comes down like he's all semiotics, like one of those like saussure.
You know, human beings end up being signs. This is a very weird thing that we'll have to get into. But also rather almost behaviorist, not denying that qualia exist, but they certainly don't do any work, right? There really is no introspection. W anything we think we know about the mind, we know because of external observations. And then we surmise that there must be something mental. So it's not saying the mental is, you know
Well we surmise it's not surmising well, maybe surmising is a good word for it.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Can knowledge be based on intuition according to Peirce?
0:07–5:50
2
What is Peirce’s view of intuition versus inference?
5:50–12:35
3
How does Peirce explain the role of signs and semiotics in cognition?
12:35–18:07
4
Why does Peirce argue that there is no ‘first’ intuition or given?
18:07–24:20
5
What does the triangle‑in‑water example illustrate about infinite regress?
24:20–30:09
6
How does Peirce distinguish abduction, induction, and deduction?
30:09–36:26
7
Why does Peirce claim that truth is a community‑driven process?
36:26–42:54
8
How does Peirce’s critique of Descartes shape his epistemology?
42:54–49:27
Speakers
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