Herman Cappelen

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421 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard Jan 2013 last heard Jan 2013

Herman Cappelen’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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New Books in Philosophy · Herman Cappelen, “Philosophy Without Intuitions” (Oxford UP, 2012) · 15 Jan 2013 podcast

In fact, I guess my view is that, and I argue this in Chapter 6, I think it's Chapter 6,

that that term is now used in so many different ways and in so many confusing ways that it's probably completely deficient as a theoretical term and maybe even meaningless.

But I think the charitable thing to do here is to try to think of a very liberal account of what the intuitive would be, and I pick three.

I consider a number of others, but I think these are three, and I sort of

and then take the disjunction of these.

So one of these, the first, which goes through almost all the literature on intuitions, is that they have a certain kind of distinctive phenomenology.

That's supposed to be a mark of the intuitive.

Another that pops up in lots of the literature is that they rely on conceptual competence in a peculiar way.

Sometimes that's described as

relying solely on conceptual competence.

In other words, it's the kind of judgments that you can make without relying on quote-unquote empirical evidence, but all you need is your conceptual

So that's the second kind of diagnostic.

The third kind of diagnostic is simply one where they have a certain special epistemic status, maybe roughly described as they can justify, but they need no justification, so they have that kind of special

Not each of those, I think, can be interpreted in different ways again.

But so what I do is I say, well, if all of those three are absent, there's no evidence of anything like that, that's at least a bit of evidence that there's no reliance on the intuitive.

So I have a very, very sort of liberal account of what would count as evidence of a reliance on the intuitive.

And then what I find in all these cases is an absence of all of that.

That was the surprising part when I did the sort of empirical work here.

So just to take a concrete case, for me, the best case, let me say first what I think is a very bad case.

I think Gettier cases have been discussed in almost 80% to 90% of all papers on this

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