Jamie Edwards
speaker
102 appearances
7 recordings
1 series
first heard Jun 2011
last heard Apr 2012
Jamie Edwards’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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Appearances
And I'm Jamie Edwards.
So you mentioned moral disagreement, and it's precisely the seeming existence of moral disagreement that has led some people to call the possibility of moral realism into question.
People see disagreements across cultures, across time, within our own cultures, of course.
And they think if there was such a thing as real objective moral facts, people would converge on it in the same way they seem to do perhaps in science.
But the persistence of moral disagreement leads some to think that it itself suggests the non-existence of moral facts.
Is this a problem?
And what's the right way to respond to this?
One way of thinking about this is some moral realists have argued that when there's disagreement, there essentially must be disagreement about the facts, the non-moral facts, or there must be disagreement about how the competing agents are reasoning.
But you're pointing out that...
There may be a case where two people continue to have moral disagreement, even though they have the same access to all the non-moral facts, they are equally capable reasoners.
And this is sometimes referred to as a case where there are epistemic peers.
So how should one, or shouldn't one, revise one's beliefs in the light of contrary opinions in this situation, when confronted with an epistemic peer?
So it seems that at this point, perhaps an asymmetry might arise.
In the one case, in the horse race case, you've told us that we have reason to accept something like equal weights view in the perceptual cases, but we don't want to accept the equal weight view in the moral cases.
So how can we avoid this asymmetry?
What is the right way to think about the moral case that it would avoid this asymmetry?
anymore.
So returning for a moment to the dispute between the altruist and the egoist, let's imagine that, again, they're epistemic peers and they appeal to you to referee their dispute.
And you offer them the principle, the one of you whose moral beliefs are true should stick to his guns.
The other one should abandon his beliefs.
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