Peter Thiel

Yeah, yeah. And then I think Gerard... intuition was much more that, in some sense, the so-called normal case is the less important one. It's the extreme case. It's the madness of crowds. That's an extremely important case. Hey, fair enough. Because Piaget also wasn't an abnormal psychologist. Piaget would have been like Malcolm Gladwell, in the wisdom of crowds.

The crowds are wise because they imitate each other, and this is how a lot of stuff works.

The crowds are wise because they imitate each other, and this is how a lot of stuff works.

The crowds are wise because they imitate each other, and this is how a lot of stuff works.

All these ways were still within some structure, but... But you could always say this is a basic difference between enlightenment rationalism and biblical revelation is, you know, in the Bible, the crowd is always wrong. The crowd is always crazy. It is mad. It's, you know, the Tower of Babel, it's in part, it's the unanimity. The Israelites. It's the unanimity.

All these ways were still within some structure, but... But you could always say this is a basic difference between enlightenment rationalism and biblical revelation is, you know, in the Bible, the crowd is always wrong. The crowd is always crazy. It is mad. It's, you know, the Tower of Babel, it's in part, it's the unanimity. The Israelites. It's the unanimity.

All these ways were still within some structure, but... But you could always say this is a basic difference between enlightenment rationalism and biblical revelation is, you know, in the Bible, the crowd is always wrong. The crowd is always crazy. It is mad. It's, you know, the Tower of Babel, it's in part, it's the unanimity. The Israelites. It's the unanimity.

And enlightenment rationality, it's always, you know, democracy is good. The more people vote for something, the more rational it is. Although, you know, at some point, you get 99.99% of the people who vote for something and you're in North Korea. And so, you know, it's a very important question. When do you go from wisdom of crowds to the madness of crowds?

And enlightenment rationality, it's always, you know, democracy is good. The more people vote for something, the more rational it is. Although, you know, at some point, you get 99.99% of the people who vote for something and you're in North Korea. And so, you know, it's a very important question. When do you go from wisdom of crowds to the madness of crowds?

And enlightenment rationality, it's always, you know, democracy is good. The more people vote for something, the more rational it is. Although, you know, at some point, you get 99.99% of the people who vote for something and you're in North Korea. And so, you know, it's a very important question. When do you go from wisdom of crowds to the madness of crowds?

And I think the Girardian, and I would say Christian intuition is that it happens much sooner and in a much more representative way than you have to, than you think. And that, you know, and this is, yeah. And so that's sort of one dimension. I don't know if I would anchor it as much on sacrifice, though, as the key feature.

And I think the Girardian, and I would say Christian intuition is that it happens much sooner and in a much more representative way than you have to, than you think. And that, you know, and this is, yeah. And so that's sort of one dimension. I don't know if I would anchor it as much on sacrifice, though, as the key feature.

And I think the Girardian, and I would say Christian intuition is that it happens much sooner and in a much more representative way than you have to, than you think. And that, you know, and this is, yeah. And so that's sort of one dimension. I don't know if I would anchor it as much on sacrifice, though, as the key feature.

And again, this is one of the places where Girard argued that it's Christianity was, in Girard's telling, is anti-sacrificial. It is a move away from sacrifice. All these theories about the substitutionary atonement of Christ's death. But even if we go

And again, this is one of the places where Girard argued that it's Christianity was, in Girard's telling, is anti-sacrificial. It is a move away from sacrifice. All these theories about the substitutionary atonement of Christ's death. But even if we go

And again, this is one of the places where Girard argued that it's Christianity was, in Girard's telling, is anti-sacrificial. It is a move away from sacrifice. All these theories about the substitutionary atonement of Christ's death. But even if we go

Well, it is Christ's death is supposed to be the last one. Christ made the sacrifice, so we do not have to make it. And then, yeah, you can say it is a sacrifice of others versus the sacrifice of self. You could say that, but you could say the way Girard would put the stress would be that you refused, it's not there was some virtue in Christ sacrificing himself.

Well, it is Christ's death is supposed to be the last one. Christ made the sacrifice, so we do not have to make it. And then, yeah, you can say it is a sacrifice of others versus the sacrifice of self. You could say that, but you could say the way Girard would put the stress would be that you refused, it's not there was some virtue in Christ sacrificing himself.

Well, it is Christ's death is supposed to be the last one. Christ made the sacrifice, so we do not have to make it. And then, yeah, you can say it is a sacrifice of others versus the sacrifice of self. You could say that, but you could say the way Girard would put the stress would be that you refused, it's not there was some virtue in Christ sacrificing himself.

He's not like some, I don't know, some sort of silly hero saying, you know, please let the lions come and eat me up or something like that, you know, giving some sort of dramatic announcement. It said, Christ at Gethsemane, you know, it's still praying, please let this cup be taken away from me. It is, so it is, it's not, you know, this is, you know, a wonderful, necessary thing to do at all.