Why Nuclear War Is More Likely Than You Think (with Carlo Rovelli)
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Why has public discussion of nuclear war become unfashionable today?
Welcome. To the rest is politics for a new series on existential risk. And I'm joined today by somebody I admire immensely, Professor Carlo Rovelli. I hope many people listening will already be familiar with his works because he writes very, very beautifully about physics and the universe. Some of the books that you may have come across, seven brief lessons on physics. Reality Is Not What It Seems. It's a lovely title. I I li I like reality is not what it seems. But today he's here actually engaging much more in something much more political. And he's here to talk to us about nuclear war. I think I'm gonna begin you there, Professor, and then we'll come back to to talk about uh who you are. uh and bring out some of this this wonderful uh
lively mind. But let's begin with that. Nuclear war feels a quite unfashionable subject. It feels like something that, you know, my father in law and mother in law were worried about in the nineteen sixties. They were all building bunkers, they all thought the Cuban missile crisis was coming, everybody was writing books. The end of the world is nine, nuclear war is happening, and then it didn't happen. for more than fifty years, sixty years. Um And so people maybe aren't talking about it quite as much as they were. Uh is this because the risk has changed? Why why are we talking about it less than we were?
Do you think? Thanks for having me, Rory, and thanks for this very kind introduction. I think that what you just said is the source of the risk. And uh the reason for me uh for writing this book about the risk. Namely, it's uh it does sound unfashionable, doesn't it? Think of this of the sixties, uh, when there were uh atomic refugees. And things like that.
What factors make the risk of nuclear conflict higher now than during the Cold War?
We're over that. And that's exactly the problem because objectively, and I use this word with a lot of caution, but I think it has to be used, the risk is higher than the 60s. The title of my book is 85 Seconds to Midnight, refers to the slogan used by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which is a comedian of scientists. scientist that tries to use uh objective parameters to evaluate the risk of a nuclear catastrophe and they come out with the conclusion They do they do this every year since the the Cold War. Uh and and they came out with the conclusion that now the risk is higher.
What are the factors which might make it more likely today than it was in the seven? There's several
there's several. Um at least four. Let me let me uh make a short list of them. First of all, what you said at the beginning, talk about atomic bombs looks out of fashion. Nobody's talking about that. So uh people are forgetting the essential um risk that they uh imply. The political discussion uh in many countries, especially in Europe, about rearmament It doesn't include the part uh yes, and then if there's war, this war is nuclear. So um the nuclear issue is not in the center of the discussion as it should and as it was in the fifteenth and the sixties. So that's one reason. The second reason Is that uh is not anymore two superpowers. The world has changed, the uh cold war has ended, Soviet Union gave up essentially, the the the Soviet leadership decided we can become capta capitalists like you, it's better for us.
Now there is a third uh nuclear superpower which is coming out, which is China, and it's not clear what Europe is gonna do with its the French and British uh nuclear armaments, which are far less than the the other three. Game of three is completely different than game of two. Because a game of two is one watch one another and we agree not to go disaster. Game of three is completely different because there's a complicated thing about trust and There is a clear advantage in everybody having the other two going to war. So somebody's pushing always for the other two going to work. That's the second reason.
How does the emergence of a third nuclear power (China) change global deterrence dynamics?
The third reason is artificial intelligence. Because uh uh not using artificial intelligence in a game which may be a game of minutes, very fast decisions, remember, now we have the equivalent of nuclear bombs in Turkey.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Why has public discussion of nuclear war become unfashionable today?
0:09–1:58
2
What factors make the risk of nuclear conflict higher now than during the Cold War?
1:58–4:19
3
How does the emergence of a third nuclear power (China) change global deterrence dynamics?
4:19–6:37
4
Why could artificial intelligence increase the likelihood of a nuclear launch?
6:37–9:06
5
Which large nuclear states pose the greatest existential threat and why?
9:06–11:25
6
How might regional tensions (e.g., Israel‑Iran, India‑Pakistan) trigger nuclear use?
11:25–13:26
7
What are the implications of Europe’s increased defence spending on nuclear weapons?
13:26–15:09
8
How can policymakers prevent a catastrophic nuclear war in the coming decade?
15:09–18:16
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